Responsibility : the epistemic condition /

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Bibliographic Details
Edition:First edition.
Imprint:Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017.
©2017
Description:viii, 301 pages ; 25 cm
Language:English
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11335046
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Wieland, Jan Willem, editor.
Robichaud, Philip, editor.
ISBN:9780198779667
0198779666
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Summary:Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars. This volume sets the agenda. Sixteen new essays address the following central questions: Does the epistemic condition require akrasia? Why does blameless ignorance excuse? Does moral ignorance sustained by one's culture excuse? Does the epistemic condition involve knowledge of the wrongness or wrongmaking features of one's action? Is the epistemic condition an independent condition, or is it derivative from one's quality of will or intentions? Is the epistemic condition sensitive to degrees of difficulty? Are there different kinds of moral responsibility and thus multiple epistemic conditions? Is the epistemic condition revisionary? What is the basic structure of the epistemic condition?
Review by Choice Review

Aristotle argued that moral responsibility requires awareness and control. Much of the contemporary discussion of moral responsibility has turned on the latter requirement, with philosophers disagreeing about what constitutes freedom and whether freedom and responsibility are compatible with either universal causal determinism or local indeterminism. Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition is an engaging collection of essays that investigate the earlier requirement, exploring the epistemic prerequisites for moral responsibility. The collection includes 16 essays on a variety of topics, including akrasia (weakness of will), when and if ignorance excuses or absolves moral responsibility, and the role of knowledge in moral responsibility. Unlike metaphysical investigations of responsibility, these discussions admit more nuance, as the question is not merely whether an agent is responsible but to what degree. This text is in the analytic philosophical tradition and written primarily for an academic audience; however, apart from some technological terminology, the essays are relatively accessible to all audiences. This is not an introductory book; the essays included offer substantive, often competing, views on the epistemic condition for moral responsibility with vivid examples and rigorous analysis. Summing Up: Recommended. Lower-division undergraduates and above. --William Simkulet, Cleveland State University

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review