Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes /

Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Gehrlein, William V., author.
Imprint:Cham : Springer, 2017.
©2017
Description:1 online resource
Language:English
Series:Studies in choice and welfare
Studies in choice and welfare.
Subject:
Elections -- Rules.
Voting -- Rules.
Elections.
Voting.
Rules.
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11384450
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Lepelley, Dominique, author.
ISBN:9783319646596
3319646591
3319646583
9783319646589
3319646583
9783319646589
Digital file characteristics:text file
PDF
Notes:Includes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters.
Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed October 25, 2017).
Summary:This monograph studies voting procedures based on the probability that paradoxical outcomes like the famous Condorcet Paradox might exist. It is well known that hypothetical examples of many different paradoxical election outcomes can be developed, but this analysis examines factors that are related to the process by which voters form their preferences on candidates that will significantly reduce the likelihood that such voting paradoxes will ever actually be observed. It is found that extreme forms of voting paradoxes should be uncommon events with a small number of candidates. Another consideration is the propensity of common voting rules to elect the Condorcet Winner, which is widely accepted as the best choice as the winner, when it exists. All common voting rules are found to have identifiable scenarios for which they perform well on the basis of this criterion. But, Borda Rule is found to consistently work well at electing the Condorcet Winner, while the other voting rules have scenarios where they work poorly or have a very small likelihood of electing a different candidate than Borda Rule. The conclusions of previous theoretical work are presented in an expository format and they are validated with empirically-based evidence. Practical implications of earlier studies are also developed.--
Other form:Print version: Gehrlein, William V. Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes. Cham : Springer, 2017 3319646583 9783319646589
Standard no.:9783319646589
10.1007/978-3-319-64659-6
10.1007/978-3-319-64
Table of Contents:
  • Preface; Contents; List of Abbreviations; Chapter 1: Elections and Voting Paradoxes; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 A Tale of Two Mathematicians; 1.3 The Historic Analyses of Borda and Condorcet; 1.3.1 Borda's Paradox; 1.3.2 Borda's Solution to the Possibility of Borda's Paradox; 1.3.3 Condorcet's Paradox; 1.3.4 Condorcet's Other Paradox; 1.3.5 Borda Versus Condorcet: Over 200 Years Later; 1.4 Other Voting Paradoxes; 1.4.1 Monotonicity Paradoxes; 1.4.2 Choice Set Variance Paradoxes; 1.4.2.1 Ostrogorski's Paradox.
  • 1.4.2.2 Majority Paradox1.4.2.3 Referendum Paradox; 1.5 Conclusion; References; Chapter 2: Probabilities of Voting Paradoxes; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Models with Independent Voter Preferences; 2.2.1 The Dual Culture Condition; 2.2.2 Impartial Culture Condition; 2.2.3 Condorcet's Paradox and Social Homogeneity with DC; 2.2.4 Condorcet Efficiency with DC; 2.3 Models with Dependent Voter Preferences; 2.3.1 The Impartial Anonymous Culture Condition; 2.3.2 Condorcet's Paradox and Dependent Preferences with IAC.
  • 2.3.3 Condorcet Efficiency and Dependent Preferences with IAC2.4 The Relevance of DC, IC, UC and IAC Models; 2.4.1 Performing Empirically-Based Evaluations of Theory; 2.4.2 An Empirically Based Evaluation of Preliminary Results; 2.5 The Likelihood of Observing Other Voting Paradoxes; 2.5.1 Borda's Paradox; 2.5.2 Condorcet's Other Paradox; 2.5.3 The No Show Paradox; 2.5.4 Ostrogorski's Paradox; 2.5.5 The Majority Paradox; 2.5.6 The Referendum Paradox; 2.6 Adding Additional Internal Structure to Voters ́Preferences; 2.7 Conclusion.
  • 3.6 Strong Measures of Group Mutual Coherence3.7 Refined Measures of Group Mutual Coherence; 3.8 Conclusion; References; Chapter 4: Single-Stage Election Procedures; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 To Rank or Not to Rank; 4.3 Increases in Efficiency from Using Ranked Preferences; 4.4 Efficiency Relationships to Group Mutual Coherence; 4.4.1 Condorcet Efficiency Relationships with Weak Measures; 4.4.2 Condorcet Efficiency Relationships with Strong Measures; 4.5 Modifications to Restrict Attention to Critical Situations.

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