Moral realities : an essay in philosophical psychology /

Platts (National Autonomous University of Mexico) attacks moral skepticism, moral subjectivism, and moral relativism; he defends moral realism. The book has two parts. The first, which investigates timeless, conceptual relationships among wanting, reasons, valuing, etc., is an exercise in what might be called philosophical psychology or the metaphysics of value. The second part addresses what Platts calls the reach of morality and analyzes and criticizes those philosophers Platts takes to be critics of morality: Hume, Mandeville, and Nietzsche, as well as contemporary philosophers such as Gilbert Harman and Bernard Williams. Platts wants to discover the theory that is internal to moral thought and practice; this he sees as a necessary first step to the assessment of morality itself and of the effectiveness of the skeptical attacks on morality by certain philosophers. Appropriate for upper-division undergraduate and graduate students in philosophy.-S. Satris, Clemson University