Consciousness and object : a mind-object identity physicalist theory /

Consciousness and object : a mind-object identity physicalist theory /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Manzotti, Riccardo, author.
Imprint:	Amsterdam ; Philadelphia : John Benjamins Publishing Company, [2017]
Description:	xiii, 254 pages ; 25 cm.
Language:	English
Series:	Advances in consciousness research (AiCR), 1381-589X ; volume 95 Advances in consciousness research ; v. 95.
Subject:	Cognition. Consciousness. Consciousness. Mind-Body Relations, Metaphysical. Psychological Theory. Cognition. Consciousness.
Format:	Print Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11456437

Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:	9789027213624 9027213623 9789027265098
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Summary:	In 1968, David Armstrong asked "what is a man"? What is the conscious mind? What is experience? This book starts from his reply "he is a certain sort of material object", but proceeds along a radically different path. The book puts forward and defends a mind-object identity theory: Being conscious of an object is just that object being me. The proposal is matched against a series of objections of both conceptual and empirical nature and eventually compared with existing externalist approaches - disjunctivism, realism, embodied cognition, enactivism, and the extended mind. Dwelling on recent empirical findings from perception and neuroscience, the proposal is defended from traditional objections such as the argument from illusion, hallucinations, dreams, and mental imagery. Can experience and objects be one and the same?
Other form:	Online version: Manzotti, Riccardo. Consciousness and object. Amsterdam ; Philadelphia : John Benjamins Publishing Company, [2017] 9789027265098

Description
Summary:	What is the conscious mind? What is experience? In 1968, David Armstrong asked "What is a man?" and replied that a man is "a certain sort of material object". This book starts from his question but proceeds along a different path. The traditional mind-brain identity theory is set aside, and a mind-object identity theory is proposed in its place: to be conscious of an object is simply to be made of that object. Consciousness is physical but not neural.<br> This groundbreaking hypothesis is supported by recent empirical findings in both perception and neuroscience, and is herein tested against a series of objections of both conceptual and empirical nature: the traditional mind-brain identity arguments from illusion, hallucinations, dreams, and mental imagery. The theory is then compared with existing externalist approaches including disjunctivism, realism, embodied cognition, enactivism, and the extended mind. Can experience and objects be one and the same?
Physical Description:	xiii, 254 pages ; 25 cm.
Bibliography:	Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:	9789027213624 9027213623 9789027265098
ISSN:	1381-589X ;