The sinews of state power : the rise and demise of the cohesive local state in rural China /
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Author / Creator: | Wang, Juan, 1977- author. |
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Imprint: | New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2017] |
Description: | xii, 243 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm |
Language: | English |
Subject: | |
Format: | Print Book |
URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11457227 |
Table of Contents:
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction. The Basics of Government: Cohesive and Robust Local States
- The Limits of State Adaptability and Local States
- Locating the Local State
- Elite Coherence and Its Conditions
- Elite Alliances, Collusion, and Institutional Corruption
- Conditions for Elite Cohesion and Incentives in Time
- Research Methodology, Sources, and Organization
- 1. Rural Government and Farmer Protest in Comparative Perspective
- Protests and Riots in the Maoist Era
- Reactive Farmer Protest
- Explaining Farmer Protest
- Protests and Petitions in the Reform Era
- Reactive Farmer Protest
- Explaining Farmer Protest
- Protest Leaders after the Reform Era
- Rural Activists
- Village Cadres
- Conclusion
- 2. The Formation and Institutionalization of Intrastate Cohesion
- The Making of New Elites: The Origins of Power and Survival
- Rational Goals and the Origin of Power
- Rational Mechanisms to Remain in Power
- Structural Orientation and Personal Networks
- Active Coordination and External Threats
- Active Coordination
- External Threats
- Reforms in the 1980s and Remaining Memories: Survival and Material Benefits
- Restructured Administration and Continuous Personnel
- Political Reforms and the Rising Importance of Patronage
- Institutionalization of Alliances in the 1990s: Local Interests and Personal Networks
- The Stabilization of Leading Cadres and Local Interests
- Interdependence and Networks within the Alliances
- Conclusion
- 3. The Changes and Continuity of Local State Cohesion
- Alliance of Survival during the Maoist Era
- Alliance of Benefits in the 1980s
- Forced Implementation of National Policies
- Rural Industrialization and Collective Deviation
- Distinctive Localism and Collective Deviation in the 1990s
- Organizational Expansion
- Excessive and Arbitrary Extraction from Society
- Covering Up for Each Other
- Run-on Debts
- Conclusion
- 4. Dismantling the Local State: The Isolated Village Cadres
- The Structural Origin of Isolated Villages
- Fiscal Reforms: Emergence of a County Leviathan
- Further Changes from Within
- Abandoned Villages
- Scapegoating of Village Cadres
- Diverging Interests among Elites and Their Reproduction
- Institutional Changes and Unexpected Scapegoats
- Case Studies: Sichuan versus Jiangsu
- County-Township Fiscal Arrangements
- Village Affairs
- Conclusion
- 5. Implications: Declining Coercive and Extractive Capacities of the State
- Declining Coercive Capacity in Maintaining Order
- Village Cadres Respond
- Towns and Counties: The Cat-and-Mouse Game
- Declining Extractive Capacities and Tax Games
- At the County Level: Individual Agendas and Economic Policies
- At the Township Level: The Illegal Tax Trade and the Accounting Game
- Case Studies: Sichuan versus Jiangsu
- Discontented Village Cadres and Their Responses
- State-Business Relations and Taxation
- Conclusion
- Conclusion
- The Emergence of a Critical Juncture and Institutional Change
- A Critical Juncture
- Institutional Change
- The Broader Implications of the China Case
- Transformation in Contentious Relationships
- Incentives in Time
- Appendix 1. Methodology
- Appendix 2. Main Survey Questions
- Appendix 3. Main Interviewees
- Notes
- References
- Index