Fatal decision : Anzio and the battle for Rome /

The author of Bitter Victory, the definitive history of the Sicilian campaign in 1943, has written an equally impressive work on the Anzio campaign of 1944. Intended as a move to outflank the German lines in Italy and easily capture Rome, the Anzio landings led to a bloody stalemate in which the Allies were nearly pushed into the sea more than once. D'Este covers both the strategic and tactical levels of the campaign in a balanced, thorough, and soundly written account. Particularly valuable is the coverage of the British experience at Anzio, even grimmer than the American but less well covered in most American histories of the campaign. Virtually indispensable for any World War II collection. Notes, sources, bibliography. ~--Roland Green

In January 1944 an Allied task force landed at Anzio on Italy's west coast, its mission to draw German forces away from the Cassino bottleneck and open the way to Rome. The landing was only lightly opposed but the Germans soon counterattacked, and for five months U.S. general John Lucas's Anglo-American VI Corps fought desperately to retain its fragile beachhead. D'Este's account of this bloody struggle and the subsequent capture of Rome is well researched and vividly told. The political, strategic and tactical aspects of the campaign are carefully reviewed, as are the dynamics of leadership on both sides. D'Este ( Decision at Normandy ) sorts out the still-simmering controversy over whether Lucas missed a great opportunity by not attempting to capture Rome early in the campaign when it was presumably undefended. First-class military history. Illustrations. (June) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

A meticulous audit of Operation Shingle, the WW II campaign designed to win Rome for Allied forces at an acceptable cost. D'Este (Bitter Victory, Decision in Normandy) provides a panoramic overview of the planning, preparation, and execution of the 1944 assault on Anzio, a Mediterranean port about 30 miles south of Rome. The aim of the amphibious thrust was to bypass strong German defenses along the so-called Gustav line and at Monte Cassino, which had stalled American and well as British armies in their drive to liberate Rome. In D'Este's persuasive view, the strike failed in its objectives for lack of decisive leadership. For example, instead of issuing firm orders, General Sir Harold Alexander made gentlemanly instructions which Mark Clark (commander of the US Fifth Army) often ignored. Nor did Clark prod subordinates to seize highways and rail lines that supplied Wehrmacht forces under the able command of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring. At any rate, the Anzio beachhead became a death trap in which Allied troops fought for their lives in rain and mud for over five dreadful months. When opposition finally crumbled under air and sea pounding, Clark neglected to pursue, let alone destroy, retreating German soldiers, so great was his ambition to be the first man into Rome. In a crowning irony, the recapture of Italy's capital was almost wholly overshadowed by the D-day landings in France. In D'Este's book, blame for the botched Anzio expedition is widely shared. Among others meriting censure, he singles out a meddlesome Winston Churchill, who sowed confusion in the Allied ranks and raised unrealistic expectations. A vivid account of a campaign that attests to the high cost of miscalculation and overconfidence in matters military. (Sixteen pages of maps--not seen.)