Phenomenology /

Lyotard's treatment of phenomenology is not a mere repetition of the main themes of Husserl; rather, it is a constructive critique (from the Hegelian and Marxist viewpoint) and a clear presentation of phenomenology's ^D["discourse,^D]" never static, always new and, in a way, provisional. The author proposes a ^D["phenomenology of phenomenology^D]": the truth of knowledge can be grasped only through its experience. After dealing with Husserl's Eidetic, the Transcendental, and the Life-world, Lyotard discusses phenomenology in relation to the human sciences, psychology, sociology, and history, with some references to postmodernity, but in particular, to the ^D["existence^D]" and the ^D["originary world^D]" of Merleau-Ponty, for whom reality is neither objective nor purely subjective, but ^D["neutral, or ambiguous.^D]" Yet, meaning is traced to the constituting subjectivity in a neutral, always becoming world. In the conclusion, Lyotard asserts quite strongly that Husserlian phenomenolgy, instead of surpassing, as it pretends, both Hegelian and Marxist philosophy, is in fact retrograde with regard to them, chiefly because of not having realized the import of the objective-subjective relation as thesis-antithesis, and that ^D["matter is itself meaning.^D]" This conclusion might be questioned. This work detaches itself from recent collections of texts, (e.g., Merleau-Ponty Vivant, ed. by M.C. Dillon (CH, Mar'92) or Texts and Dialogues, ed. by H.J. Silverman and J. Barry Jr. (CH, Jun'92), whose aim is to present Merleau-Ponty's philosophy directly; whereas Lyotard writes to instruct in a clear style, thus making phenomenology accessible even to the neophyte. Both undergraduate and graduate collections.