Reason and the heart : a prolegomenon to a critique of passional reason /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Wainwright, William J.
Imprint:Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1995.
Description:1 online resource (x, 160 pages)
Language:English
Series:Cornell studies in the philosophy of religion
Cornell studies in the philosophy of religion.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11678144
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9781501717321
1501717324
0801431395
9780801431395
9780801473487
Digital file characteristics:data file
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Print version record.
Summary:Between the opposing claims of reason and religious subjectivity may be a middle ground, William J. Wainwright argues. His book is a philosophical reflection on the role of emotion in guiding reason. There is evidence, he contends, that reason functions properly only when informed by a rightly disposed heart.
Other form:Print version: Wainwright, William J. Reason and the heart. Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1995 0801431395
Review by Choice Review

Wainwright (Univ. of Wisconsin, Milwaukee) explores the view that religious beliefs can and should be based on supporting evidence that can be accurately assessed only by people having suitable moral and spiritual capacities. This view implies that a "properly disposed heart" is needed for one to see the "force" of certain evidence bearing on religious beliefs. Calvin and Aquinas suggested such a view, but Wainwright devotes the opening chapter to its defense by Jonathan Edwards, arguing for the plausibility of Edwards's view, given his theism. Chapters 2 and 3 contend that the epistemological views of John Henry Newman and William James have important affinities with Edwards's view of religious reasoning. Newman and James identified the influence of our "passional nature" on all reasoning. Chapter 4 replies to some objections to the view that our passional nature may influence our reasoning and beliefs. Chapter 5 considers the threat of relativism, arguing that such a view as Edwards's does not imply the relativity of either truth or standards of rationality. The epilogue offers arguments for taking an Edwards-style view of reason seriously. Highly recommended for all philosophy collections. Graduate; faculty. P. K. Moser; Loyola University of Chicago

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review