Risk adjustment, risk sharing and premium regulation in health insurance markets : theory and practice /
Saved in:
| Imprint: | London : Academic Press, [2018] ©2018 |
|---|---|
| Description: | 1 online resource. |
| Language: | English |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | E-Resource Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11690194 |
MARC
| LEADER | 00000cam a2200000Ii 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 11690194 | ||
| 005 | 20180928111404.4 | ||
| 006 | m o d | ||
| 007 | cr cnu|||unuuu | ||
| 008 | 180813s2018 enk ob 001 0 eng d | ||
| 019 | |a 1048941789 | ||
| 020 | |a 9780128113264 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 012811326X |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |z 9780128113257 | ||
| 020 | |z 0128113251 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1048402961 |z (OCoLC)1048941789 | ||
| 035 | 9 | |a (OCLCCM-CC)1048402961 | |
| 040 | |a N$T |b eng |e rda |e pn |c N$T |d N$T |d OPELS |d EBLCP |d OCLCF |d YDX |d NLE | ||
| 049 | |a MAIN | ||
| 050 | 4 | |a HG9384 | |
| 072 | 7 | |a BUS |x 033070 |2 bisacsh | |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a Risk adjustment, risk sharing and premium regulation in health insurance markets : |b theory and practice / |c edited by Thomas G. McGuire, Richard C. van Kleef. |
| 264 | 1 | |a London : |b Academic Press, |c [2018] | |
| 264 | 4 | |c ©2018 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource. | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent |0 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/contentTypes/txt | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia |0 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/mediaTypes/c | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier |0 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/carriers/cr | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index. | ||
| 588 | 0 | |a Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed August 22, 2018). | |
| 505 | 0 | |a Front Cover; Risk Adjustment, Risk Sharing and Premium Regulation in Health Insurance Markets; Copyright Page; Contents; List of Contributors; Regulated Competition in Health Insurance Markets: Foreword by Alain Enthoven; Acknowledgments; I: Theory; 1 Regulated Competition in Health Insurance Markets: Paradigms and Ongoing Issues; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Intellectual Roots of Regulated Competition; 1.2.1 Evolution of the Enthoven Model: Individual-Insurance Markets Managed by a Sponsor-Regulator; 1.2.2 Diamond Model: "First-Stage" Group-Level Competition; 1.3 Prevalence of Regulated Competition | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 1.3.1 Individual and Group-Level Competition in the United States1.3.2 Individual-Level Competition in Europe; 1.3.3 Regulated Competition in Australia, Asia, and Latin America; 1.4 The Role of Health Plan Payment in Regulated Competition; 1.4.1 The Broader Menu of Regulatory Tools; 1.4.2 Regulation of Health Plan Payment; 1.5 The Outline of This Volume; Endnote; 2 Premium Regulation, Risk Equalization, Risk Sharing, and Subsidies: Effects on Affordability and Efficiency; 2.1 Introduction; 2.1.1 Risk Rating: A Threat to the Affordability of Basic Coverage for High-Risk People | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 2.1.2 Risk Selection: A Threat to Both Affordability and Efficiency2.1.3 The Goal and Outline of This Chapter; 2.2 Starting Point of Our Analyses; 2.3 How Risk Rating and Risk Selection Affect Efficiency: A Graphical Framework; 2.3.1 Risk Rating: Good for Efficiency; 2.3.2 Risk Selection by Consumers: Bad for Efficient Sorting; 2.3.3 Risk Selection by Insurers: Bad for Efficiency of Plan Design and Efficiency of Production; 2.4 Benchmark for Analyzing the Effects of Payment System Interventions; 2.5 Premium Regulation; 2.6 Risk Equalization, Risk Sharing, and Subsidies to Insurers | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 2.6.1 Risk Equalization Without an External Subsidy2.6.2 Risk Sharing Without an External Subsidy; 2.6.3 Effects of Risk Equalization and Risk Sharing Without an External Subsidy; 2.6.4 The Effects of an External Subsidy to Insurers; 2.6.5 Risk Equalization or Risk Sharing With an External Fixed Subsidy; 2.7 Subsidies to Consumers; 2.7.1 Premium-Based Subsidies to Consumers; 2.7.2 Risk-Based Subsidies to Consumers; 2.7.3 Income-Based Subsidies to Consumers; 2.8 Summary and Conclusion; Acknowledgments; 3 Risk Adjustment for Health Plan Payment; 3.1 Introduction | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 3.2 Criteria Guiding the Design of Risk Adjustment Models3.2.1 Efficiency; 3.2.1.1 Avoiding Endogenous Signals; 3.2.1.2 Avoiding Noisy Signals; 3.2.1.3 Avoiding Incentives Not to Prevent or Cure; 3.2.1.4 Maintaining Incentives for Cost Control ("Power"); 3.2.1.5 Avoiding Overpayment; 3.2.1.6 Avoiding Service-Level Selection Incentives; 3.2.2 Fairness; 3.2.3 Feasibility; 3.2.4 Ten Principles in Pope et al. (2004); 3.3 Choice of Estimation Sample; 3.3.1 Sample Exclusions; 3.3.2 Separate Formulas for Population Subgroups; 3.3.3 Separate Formulas for Different Health Plan Benefits | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Health insurance |x Cost control. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Health insurance premiums. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh96009440 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Insurance / Risk Assessment & Management. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Health insurance |x Cost control. |2 fast |0 http://id.worldcat.org/fast/fst01725516 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Health insurance premiums. |2 fast |0 http://id.worldcat.org/fast/fst01715846 | |
| 655 | 4 | |a Electronic books. | |
| 700 | 1 | |a McGuire, Thomas G., |e editor. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n81040807 |1 http://viaf.org/viaf/100160310/ | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Kleef, Richard van, |e editor. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2015190290 |1 http://viaf.org/viaf/169307668/ | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |c Original |z 0128113251 |z 9780128113257 |w (OCoLC)1020032331 |
| 929 | |a oclccm | ||
| 999 | f | f | |i 68bfaf31-1dc4-5e0e-8f40-575e1bb8acfb |s 78c22aeb-169e-584c-b657-3942ceb155ad |
| 928 | |t Library of Congress classification |a HG9384 |l Online |c UC-FullText |u https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/book/9780128113257 |z Elsevier |g ebooks |i 11128962 | ||