Empiricism and Darwin's science /

A sophisticated analysis of Darwinian theory of evolution from an empiricist perspective. Wilson (University of Toronto) vigorously defends a version of logical empiricist philosophy of science following the views of Gustav Bergmann (Philosophy of Science, 1957). The analysis focuses on the logical structure of explanations, distinguishing between confirmable but nonfalsifiable general theories that posit the existence of laws as opposed to falsifiable process laws that explain particular events. Wilson critically discusses an extensive literature in the philosophy of science in general as well as in the philosophy of biology. He attacks much current philosophy of science though he finds support for his views in an adaptation of ideas of Thomas S. Kuhn (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962). Rewarding in its rich argumentation, some rather polemical, this work is an important challenge to a number of currently prevalent views on the structure and status of evolutionary theory. Upper-division undergraduate and graduate collections.-H. C. Byerly, University of Arizona