Epistemic reasons, norms and goals /

Epistemic reasons, norms and goals /

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Bibliographic Details
Imprint:Berlin ; Boston : Walter De Gruyter GmbH, [2016]
Description:1 online resource (vii, 453 pages)
Language:English
Subject:
Epistemics.
Knowledge, Theory of.
Normativity (Ethics)
Epistemics.
Knowledge, Theory of.
Normativity (Ethics)
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11758952
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Grajner, Martin, editor.
Schmechtig, Pedro, 1968- editor.
ISBN:9783110493634
3110493632
9783110496765
3110496763
9783110496345
3110496348
Digital file characteristics:text file PDF
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
In English.
Print version record.
Summary:In recent years, questions about epistemic reasons, norms and goals have seen an upsurge of interest. The present volume brings together eighteen essays by established and upcoming philosophers in the field. The contributions are arranged into four sections: (1) epistemic reasons, (2) epistemic norms, (3) epistemic consequentialism and (4) epistemic goals and values. The volume is key reading for researchers interested in epistemic normativity.
What are epistemic reasons? What are epistemic norms? What is our basic epistemic goal? In recent years, questions about epistemic reasons, norms, and goals have seen an upsurge of interest. Pursuing these questions has not only proven fertile for our und.
Other form:Print version: Epistemic reasons, norms and goals. Berlin ; Boston : Walter De Gruyter GmbH, [2016] 9783110496345
Standard no.:10.1515/9783110496765
Table of Contents:
  • Frontmatter
  • Table of Contents
  • Acknowledgements
  • Introduction: Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals
  • I. Epistemic Reasons
  • In Defense of Psychologism About Reasons
  • Learning from Learning from our Mistakes
  • Destabilizing the Error Theory
  • Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against
  • II. Epistemic Norms
  • Belief, Truth and Radical Disagreement
  • Assertion, Knowledge and Rational Credibility: The Scoreboard
  • Commonality Reconsidered: On the Common Source of Epistemic Standards
  • Epistemic Standards: High Hopes and Low Expectations
  • What do I care About Epistemic Norms?
  • III Epistemic Consequentialism
  • Epistemic Normativity: From Direct to Indirect Epistemic Consequentialism
  • Tradeoffs, Self-Promotion, and Epistemic Teleology
  • Epistemic Consequentialism: Its Relation to Ethical Consequentialism and the Truth-Indication Principle
  • How to Overstretch the Ethics-Epistemology Analogy: Berker's Critique of Epistemic Consequentialism
  • IV. Epistemic Goals and Values
  • External Goals and Inherent Norms
  • A Cluster-Conception of Epistemic Normativity
  • The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth: Reflections on Rosenberg
  • Ought to Believe, Evidential Understanding and the Pursuit of Wisdom
  • Epistemic Axiology
  • Objectual Understanding, Factivity and Belief
  • Contributors
  • Author Index
  • Subject Index.

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