Wittgenstein on logic as the method of philosophy : re-examining the roots and development of analytic philosophy /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Kuusela, Oskari, author.
Edition:	First edition.
Imprint:	Oxford ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2019.
Description:	xi, 297 pages ; 24 cm
Language:	English
Subject:	Wittgenstein, Ludwig, -- 1889-1951. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, -- 1889-1951. Analysis (Philosophy) Language and languages -- Philosophy. Logic. Analysis (Philosophy) Language and languages -- Philosophy. Logic.
Format:	Print Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11791951

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ISBN:	0198829752 9780198829751
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Summary:	In Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy, Oskari Kuusela examines Wittgenstein's early and late philosophies of logic, situating their philosophical significance in early and middle analytic philosophy with particular reference to Frege, Russell, Carnap, and Strawson. He argues that not only the early but also the later Wittgenstein sought to further develop the logical-philosophical approaches of his contemporaries. Throughout his career Wittgenstein's aim was to resolve problems with and address the limitations of Frege's and Russell's accounts of logic and their logical methodologies so as to achieve the philosophical progress that originally motivated the logical-philosophical approach. By re-examining the roots and development of analytic philosophy, Kuusela seeks to open up covered up paths for the further development of analytic philosophy. Offering a novel interpretation of the philosopher, he explains how Wittgenstein extends logical methodology beyond calculus-based logical methods and how his novel account of the status of logic enables one to do justice to the complexity and richness of language use and thought while retaining rigour and ideals of logic such as simplicity and exactness. In addition, this volume outlines the new kind of non-empiricist naturalism developed in Wittgenstein's later work and explaining how his account of logic can be used to dissolve the long-standing methodological dispute between the ideal and ordinary language schools of analytic philosophy. It is of interest to scholars, researchers, and advance students of philosophy interested in engaging with a number of scholarly debates.

Table of Contents:

Acknowledgements
Introduction
1. Frege's and Russell's New Logic: The Promise of Philosophical Progress
1.1. Logic as the Method of Philosophy: The Notion of a Logical Language
1.2. The Object of Investigation of Logic: Anti-Psychologism
1.3. Frege, Russell, and the Tractatus
1.4. An Interpretational Dispute Relating to the Tractatus
2. The Tractatus' Philosophy of Logic and the Logocentric Predicament
2.1. Logic as a Universal Science and the Logocentric Predicament
2.2. The Tractatus' Solution to the Logocentric Predicament
2.2.1. Wittgenstein's critique of Frege's and Russell's axiomatic accounts of logic
2.2.2. Logic takes care of itself: Apriority and logic as a clarificatory discipline
2.2.3. Logical generality and the failure of theses as expressions of logical necessity
2.3. Truth or Correctness in Logic and the Possibility of a Metaperspective
3. The Tractatus' Philosophy of Logic and Catnap
3.1. Logic as Syntax: Agreement, Some Differences, and Carnap's Departure
3.2. The Wittgenstein-Carnap Plagiarism Affair Revisited
3.3. The Possibility of Speaking About Syntax
3.4. Wittgenstein and the Quasi-Syntactical Mode of Speech
3.5. Quasi-Syntax and Translatability
3.6. The Saying-Showing Distinction and Carnap's Philosophy of Logic
3.7. Showing and Tolerance
4. Ideality and Reality: Beyond Apriorism, Empiricism, and Conventionalism
4.1. Wittgenstein's Starting Point: Logic as Ideal and Pure
4.2. Ideality and Sublimation: Turning Away from Concrete Cases
4.3. The New Role of the Ideal and 'Our Real Need'
4.4. Turning the Examination Around: Idealization in Logic
4.5. Beyond the Trichotomy of Apriorism, Empiricism, and Conventionalism
4.6. The Intertwinedness of the Factual and the Logical
5. The Method of Language-Games as a Method of Logic
5.1. Beyond Calculi of Propositions: Plurality and the Absence of Foundations
5.2. The Notion of a Language-Game
5.3. Language-Games as the Context for the Use of Words
5.4. The Notions of Completeness and Systematic Theory
5.5. The Status of Language-Games as Models for Language Use
5.6. The Method of Language-Games as an Extension of Logic
6. Non-Empiricist. Naturalism: The Uses of Natural History in Logic
6.1. Quasi-Ethnology: Natural Historical Pictures and Truth in Logic
6.2. Ways of Using Natural History in Logic
6.3. Empirical Explanations vs Logical Descriptions
6.4. Natural History and Philosophical Anthropology
6.5. Complementary Uses of Models: Multidimensional Logical Descriptions
6.6. Multidimensionality, Completeness, and Truth
7. Resolving the Dispute Between Ideal and Ordinary Language Approaches
7.1. Two Approaches to Philosophical Clarification
7.2. Strawson's Critique of Carnap and Problems with Strawson's Critique
7.3. Logical Idealization: Dissolving the Dispute
7.4. Explication vs Clarifications as Objects of Comparison
Epilogue
Endnotes
Bibliography
Index

Wittgenstein on logic as the method of philosophy : re-examining the roots and development of analytic philosophy /

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