Review by Choice Review
Both at the University of Alabama, Birmingham, Stephens (philosophy) and Graham (philosophy and psychology) examine verbal hallucinations and "thought insertion" as examples of "alienated self-consciousness" in which people are aware of certain episodes in their mental lives but experience them as alien, i.e., attributable to another person. The authors consider the phenomenology of these experiences and their implications for psychopathology, cognitive psychology, and philosophy; they suggest that alien episodes are due to a disturbed sense of agency--a condition in which an individual no longer has the sense of being the agent who thinks the thought or who acts on it. To demonstrate how sense of agency is a key element in self-consciousness, the authors draw from the study of attribution theory, dissociative disorders, perceptual psychology, and schizophrenic symptomatology; they omit mention of mediumship. Though they admit that their "breakdown of agency" model is speculative, S tephens and Graham try to demonstrate its superiority to other explanatory models. In so doing they make an admirable contribution to the psychological and philosophical literature, one that demonstrates the ways in which philosophy can inform the interdisciplinary study of consciousness. Upper-division undergraduates through professionals. S. Krippner Saybrook Graduate School
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review
