Evolving enactivism : basic minds meet content /

Evolving enactivism : basic minds meet content /

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Hutto, Daniel D., author.
Imprint:Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, [2017]
©2017
Description:1 online resource (xxvi, 328 pages)
Language:English
Series:The MIT Press Ser.
MIT Press Ser.
Subject:
Philosophy of mind.
Cognitive science.
Act (Philosophy)
Intentionalism.
Mental representation.
Intentionality (Philosophy)
Phenomenology.
Content (Psychology)
Act (Philosophy)
Cognitive science.
Content (Psychology)
Intentionalism.
Intentionality (Philosophy)
Mental representation.
Phenomenology.
Philosophy of mind.
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11796896
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Myin, Erik, author.
ISBN:9780262339773
0262339773
9780262036115
0262036118
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Print version record.
Summary:Evolving Enactivism" argues that cognitive phenomena - perceiving, imagining, remembering -- can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have content while others - the most elementary ones - do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones. Hutto and Myin argue that the most basic forms of cognition do not, contrary to a currently popular account of cognition, involve picking up and processing information that is then used, reused, stored, and represented in the brain. Rather, basic cognition is contentless - fundamentally interactive, dynamic, and relational. In advancing the case for a radically enactive account of cognition, Hutto and Myin propose crucial adjustments to our concept of cognition and offer theoretical support for their revolutionary rethinking, emphasizing its capacity to explain basic minds in naturalistic terms. They demonstrate the explanatory power of the duplex vision of cognition, showing how it offers powerful means for understanding quintessential cognitive phenomena without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries into the mix
Other form:Print version: Hutto, Daniel D. Evolving enactivism. Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, [2017] 9780262036115
Table of Contents:
  • Preface; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; 1 Revolution in Mind?; E Is the Word; Old School Cognitivism; Degrees of Radicality; With and without Content; Naturalist Rules of Engagement; 2 Reasons to REConceive; Equal Partners; Continuity and Break; Less Can Be More; A Radical REConceiving; Handling the Hard Problem; 3 From Revolution to Evolution; REC's Positive Program; A Certain Take on Predictive Processing; Bootstrap Heaven or Hell?; 4 RECtifying and REConnecting; RECtifying; Making Sense of Sense Making; Keeping Affordances Affordable; REConnecting.
  • 5 Ur-Intentionality: What's It All About?Getting to the Bottom of Intentionality; Ur-Intentionality: The Natural Explanation; Objects and Objections; 6 Continuity: Kinks Not Breaks; Getting Radical about the Origins of Content; REC's Fatal Dilemma?; Evolutionary Discontinuity?; Kinky Cognition: A Sketch of a Possible Story; 7 Perceiving; Out of the Armchair; Once More unto the Predictive Breach; Integration and Interface; Basic Perceiving Meets Content; 8 Imagining; Beyond REC's Reach; Trouble in Mind! Imagine That; A Hybrid, Pluralist Solution: Two Takes.

Similar Items