Not in their name : are citizens culpable for their states' actions? /

Not in their name : are citizens culpable for their states' actions? /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Lawford-Smith, Holly, author.
Edition:First edition.
Imprint:Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2019.
©2019
Description:viii, 185 pages ; 23 cm.
Language:English
Series:New topics in applied philosophy
New topics in applied philosophy.
Subject:
Citizenship -- Moral and ethical aspects.
Citizenship -- Moral and ethical aspects.
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11803752
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:0198833660
9780198833666
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 175-181) and index.
Summary:There are many actions that we attribute, at least colloquially, to states. Given their size and influence, states are able to inflict harm far beyond the reach of a single individual. But there is a great deal of unclarity about exactly who is implicated in that kind of harm, and how we should think about responsibility for it. It is a commonplace assumption that democratic publics both authorize and have control over what their states do; that their states act in their name and on their behalf. In Not In Their Name, Holly Lawford-Smith approaches these questions from the perspective of social ontology, asking whether the state is a collective agent, and whether ordinary citizens are members of that agent. If it is, and they are, there's a clear case for democratic collective culpability. She explores alternative conceptions of the state and of membership in the state; alternative conceptions of collective agency applied to the state; the normative implications of membership in the state; and both culpability (from the inside) and responsibility (from the outside) for what the state does. Ultimately, Lawford-Smith argues for the exculpation of ordinary citizens and the inculpation of those working in public services.
Table of Contents:
  • Acknowledgements
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. What is The State?
  • I. The Options
  • II. Citizen-Inclusive States
  • III. Membership: Location, Legal Status, Relations, Causal Contribution
  • IV. Membership: Normative Interaction, Duty Transferral
  • V. States as the Formal Apparatus of Governance
  • 3. Is the Citizen-Inclusive State an Agent?
  • I. Strong Accounts of Collective Agency
  • II. Moderate Accounts of Collective Agency
  • III. Weak Accounts of Collective Agency
  • IV. Collective Agency and Collective Moral Agency
  • V. Citizen-Inclusive States as Agents: The Upshot
  • 4. Is the Citizen-Exclusive State an Agent?
  • I. The Structure of the Citizen-Exclusive State
  • II. From Decision to Action (Intention and Implementation)
  • III. Subordinates as Extended Minds
  • IV. Is the Citizen-Exclusive State an Agent?
  • V. Is the Citizen-Exclusive State a Moral Agent?
  • VI. Relationship between the Citizen-Exclusive State and Its Citizens
  • 5. Citizens' Culpability and Responsibility for States' Actions
  • Part 1. Culpability
  • I. Citizens' Culpability for States' Actions
  • II. A Thought Experiment Three Ways
  • III. Responsibility for Weak Shared Agency
  • IV. One-Off and Episodic Agency, or, Culpability for Joint Action
  • V. Citizens are not Culpable for States' Actions
  • Part 2. Responsibility
  • VI. Commissioning, Coercion, Complicity
  • VII. Association, Benefiting, Privilege, Capacity
  • VIII. A Note on Comparative Demandingness
  • IX. Citizen Responsibility in Summary
  • 6. Governmental Culpability
  • I. Collective Punishment: Some Clarifications
  • II. The Challenge: Group and Member Culpability
  • III. Corporations, Armies, Governments
  • IV. Collective Culpability and Distributed Punishment
  • V. Getting Members off the Hook
  • VI. Double-Counting Responsibility
  • 7. Conclusion
  • References
  • Index
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