The logic of information : a theory of philosophy as conceptual design /
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Author / Creator: | Floridi, Luciano, 1964- author. |
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Edition: | First edition. |
Imprint: | Oxford ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2019. |
Description: | xxii, 240 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm |
Language: | English |
Subject: | |
Format: | E-Resource Print Book |
URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11807066 |
Table of Contents:
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- List of Most Common Acronyms
- List of Figures
- Part I. Philosophy's Open Questions
- 1. What is a Philosophical Question?
- Summary
- 1. Introduction: Russell's 'such ultimate questions'
- 2. The Variety of Questions
- 3. A Resource-oriented Approach to the Nature of Questions
- 4. Three Kinds of Question
- 5. Philosophical Questions as Open Questions
- 6. First Objection: There are No Open Questions
- 7. Second Objection: There are Too Many Open Questions
- 8. Third Objection: Open Questions are Unanswerable
- 9. Fourth Objection: Open Questions are Indiscriminate
- Conclusion: Philosophy as Conceptual Design
- 2. Philosophy as Conceptual Design
- Summary
- 1. Introduction: From the User's Knowledge to the Makers Knowledge
- 2. Plato's Wrong Step
- 3. The Maker's Knowledge Tradition
- 4. A Constructionist Methodology
- 5. Minimalism
- 6. The Method of Levels of Abstraction
- 7. Constructionism
- Conclusion: Against Degenerate Epistemology
- 3. Constructionism as Non-naturalism
- Summary
- 1. Introduction: A Plea for Non-naturalism
- 2. The Nature of Naturalism
- 3. Two Indefensible Non-naturalisms: The Supernatural and the Preternatural
- 4. Two Defensible Non-naturalisms: The Normative and the Semantic
- 5. In Defence of Non-naturalism
- Conclusion: The Artefactual Nature of the Natural
- Part II. Philosophy as Conceptual Design
- 4. Perception and Testimony as Data Providers
- Summary
- 1. Introduction: The Relationship between Knowledge and Information
- 2. A First Potential Difficulty
- 3. Some Background
- 4. Perception and the Phaedrus' Test (Plato)
- 5. Testimony and the Parrot's Test (Descartes)
- 6. Data Providers
- 7. A Second Potential Difficulty
- 8. More Background
- 9. The Vice Analogy
- 10. The Constructionist Interpretation of Perception and Testimony
- 11. Informational Realism: Structures, Interactions, and Causality
- Conclusion: The Beautiful Glitch
- 5. Information Quality
- Summary
- 1. Big Data
- 2. The Epistemological Problem with Big Data
- 3. From Big Data to Small Patterns
- 4. Information Quality
- 5. The Epistemological Problem with Information Quality
- 6. A Bi-categorical Approach to Information Quality 110 Conclusion: Back to Fit-for-Purpose
- 6. Informational Scepticism and the Logically Possible
- Summary
- 1. Introduction: History and Analysis of Scepticism
- 2. The Two Faces of Scepticism
- 3. Non-naturalism and the Foundational Problem in German-speaking Philosophy
- 4. Coherentism, Naturalism, and the Refutation of Scepticism in British
- Philosophy
- 5. Pragmatist Epistemologies in American Philosophy
- 6. Possible Worlds and Bore! Numbers
- 7. The Edit Distance as a Modal Metrics
- 8. Informational Scepticism or the Sceptical Challenge Reconstructed
- 9. The Redundancy of Radical Informational Scepticism
- 10. The Usefulness of Moderate Informational Scepticism
- 11. Objections and Replies
- Conclusion: From Descartes to Peirce
- 7. A Defence of Information Closure
- Summary
- 1. Introduction: The Modal Logic of Being Informed
- 2. The Formulation of the Principle of Information Closure
- 3. The Sceptical Objection
- 4. A Defence of the Principle
- 5. Objection and Reply
- Conclusion: Information Closure and the Logic of Being Informed
- 8. Logical Fallacies as Bayesian Informational Shortcuts
- Summary
- 1. Introduction: A Greener Approach to Logic
- 2. "What are Logical Fallacies?
- 3. Do Formal Logical Fallacies Provide Any Information?
- 4. Formal Logical Fallacies and Their Explanations
- 5. Bayes' Theorem
- 6. Bayes' Theorem and the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent
- 7. Bayes 'theorem and the Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent
- 8. Logical Formal Fallacies and Their Bayesian Interpretation
- 9. Advantages of the Bayesian Interpretation of Formal Logical Fallacies
- Conclusion: Rationality Regained
- 9. Maker's Knowledge, between A Priori and A Posteriori
- Summary
- 1. Introduction: The Question about Maker's Knowledge
- 2. Maker's Knowledge: Same Information
- 3. Maker's Knowledge: Different Account
- 4. Maker's Knowledge; ab anteriori
- Conclusion: Some Consequences of the Analysis of the Maker's Knowledge
- 10. The Logic of Design as a Conceptual Logic of Information
- Summary
- 1. Introduction: Two Modern Conceptual Logics of Information
- 2. Design, Contradictions, and Dialetheism
- 3. The Logic of Design as a Logic of Requirements
- Conclusion: From Mimesis to Poiesis
- Afterword-Rebooting Philosophy
- Introduction
- Scholasticism as the Philosophical Enemy of Open Questions
- Philosophical Questions Worth Asking
- A Philosophical Anthropology to Approach Philosophical Questions
- How to Make Sense of the World and Design It Today
- Conclusion: Creative Destruction in Philosophy
- References
- Index