Review by Choice Review
This is another contribution to the literature on why states do or don't pursue nuclear weapons. Specifically, the author is interested in nuclear nonproliferation agreements such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. He finds a clear answer: proactive negotiations can convince potential proliferators to abjure nuclear weapons by overcoming inherent challenges such as verification and incomplete information. Using formal models, the author approaches nuclear proliferation as a bargaining problem. The method is rigorous and will interest scholars looking to refine theories of proliferation. The book uses case studies, including some unrelated to proliferation, to support the "butter-for-guns" model. Though the method here is sound, much of the conclusion--that rising states can be convinced to forgo their proliferation decisions--will either be self-evident to practitioners or not particularly useful. Although models account for much, resistance or receptiveness to entering into nonproliferation agreements, especially by American policy makers, is frequently rooted in ideology and the appeasement narrative. Nonetheless, this book is another useful contribution to the extensive literature on nuclear proliferation. Summing Up: Recommended. Graduate students through faculty. --Jeffrey Fields, University of Southern California
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review
