Strategy on the United States Supreme Court /

Strategy on the United States Supreme Court /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Brenner, Saul, 1932-
Imprint:	Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Description:	1 online resource (xi, 196 pages)
Language:	English
Subject:	United States. -- Supreme Court -- Decision making. United States. -- Supreme Court. Judicial process -- United States. Decision making. Judicial process. United States.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11814590

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	Whitmeyer, Joseph, 1960-
ISBN:	9780511719370 051171937X 9780511816024 0511816022 052173634X 9780521736343 0521516722 9780521516723 9780521516723 9780521736343
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 177-188) and index. Print version record.
Summary:	To what extent do the justices on the Supreme Court behave strategically? In Strategy on the United States Supreme Court, Saul Brenner and Joseph M. Whitmeyer investigate the answers to this question and reveal that justices are substantially less strategic than many Supreme Court scholars believe. By examining the research to date on each of the justice's important activities, Brenner and Whitmeyer's work shows that the justices often do not cast their certiorari votes in accord with the outcome-prediction strategy, that the other members of the conference coalition bargain successfully with the majority opinion writer in less than 6 percent of the situations, and that most of the fluidity in voting on the Court is nonstrategic. This work is essential to understanding how strategic behavior - or its absence - influences the decisions of the Supreme Court and, as a result, American politics and society.
Other form:	Print version: Brenner, Saul, 1932- Strategy on the United States Supreme Court. Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2009

Table of Contents:

The legal model
The attitudinal model
The strategic models
The losing litigant model
The outcome-prediction strategy
Strategic voting at the conference vote
Fluidity and strategic voting
The extent of successful bargaining over the content of the majority opinion
The size of opinion coalitions
At whose ideal point will the majority opinion be written?
Reciprocity on the Supreme Court
The separation of powers model
Supreme Court decision making and public opinion
Strategies in pursuit of institutional goals.