Hitler slept late and other blunders that cost him the war /

In certain intellectual circles, it is fashionable to condemn Hitler's barbarism while paying tribute to his "genius." This view can be paraphrased as, "Sure, he was a monster, but he built the Autobahn, the Volkswagen, and his military tactics caught European leaders with their pants down." In this short, cogent, and useful work, Duffy thoroughly debunks the myth of Hitler's genius. Focusing primarily on Hitler's military decisions, Duffy shows that Hitler's contempt for his soldier's lives and his constant rejection of competent military advice led to a series of critical blunders. Duffy doesn't break any new ground--Hitler's rigidity at Stalingrad, his confusion at D-Day, and his delusions about his "miracle" weapons are all familiar to historians. Nevertheless, for the general reader, this work serves as a reminder that Hitler's only genius was his ability to manipulate the politics of the gutter. ~--Jay Freeman

These books pay tribute to a continuing interest in the Third Reich and its leadership. Duffy's title refers to Hitler's errors in preparing for the Normandy invasion, culminating in his sleeping through the first hours of D-Day. Duffy describes the Fuhrer as making war on the basis of will and intuition, scorning the advice of professionals as he followed his destiny to catastrophe. Other crucial mistakes included failure to mount a cross-Channel invasion immediately after Dunkirk, invading Russia before dealing with Britain, and declaring war on the United States in 1941. Duffy derives his interpretations from standard accounts and exaggerates the impact of specific decisions. General readers, particularly young ones, may find this well-written summary interesting. However, Ronald Lewin's Hitler's Mis takes (Morrow, 1984), addresses the same subject with greater comprehension. Hitler's Commanders offers thumbnail military biographies of officers from all three branches of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS. The authors furnish no criteria for selection beyond personal interest in particular careers. The result is a haphazard compendium of descriptive narratives whose subjects range from grand admirals to tank commanders and fighter pilots. The book's random structure significantly limits its contribution to our understanding of the German officer corps. A work of the same size focusing on division and corps commanders, with a comparative and analytical dimension, would be well within the authors' demonstrated capabilities and have far more appeal to both general readers and specialists.-- Dennis E. Showalter, Colorado Coll., Colorado Springs (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.