The Midas paradox : financial markets, government policy shocks, and the Great Depression /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Sumner, Scott, 1955-
Imprint:Oakland, California : The Independent Institute, [2015]
Description:1 online resource
Language:English
Series:Independent studies in political economy
Independent studies in political economy.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11908953
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9781598131536
1598131532
9781598131529
1598131524
9781598131505
1598131508
9781598131512
1598131516
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Print version record.
Summary:Economic historians have made great progress in unraveling the causes of the Great Depression, but not until Scott Sumner came along has anyone explained the multitude of twists and turns the economy took. In The Midas Paradox: Financial Markets, Government Policy Shocks, and the Great Depression, Sumner offers his magnum opus the first book to comprehensively explain both monetary and non-monetary causes of that cataclysm. Drawing on financial market data and contemporaneous news stories, Sumner shows that the Great Depression is ultimately a story of incredibly bad policymaking by central bankers, legislators, and two presidents especially mistakes related to monetary policy and wage rates. He also shows that macroeconomic thought has long been captive to a false narrative that continues to misguide policymakers in their quixotic quest to promote robust and sustainable economic growth. The Midas Paradox is a landmark treatise that solves mysteries that have long perplexed economic historians, and corrects misconceptions about the true causes, consequences, and cures of macroeconomic instability. Like Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz's A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, it is one of those rare books destined to shape all future research on the subject.--
Other form:Print version: Sumner, Scott B. Midas paradox. Oakland, California : Independent Institute, [2015] 9781598131505
Table of Contents:
  • Introduction
  • From the Wall Street crash to the first banking panic
  • The German crisis of 1931
  • The "liquidity trap" of 1932
  • A foolproof plan for reflation
  • The NIRA and the hidden depression
  • The rubber dollar
  • The demise of the gold bloc
  • The gold panic
  • The midas curse and the Roosevelt depression
  • The influence of the depression on macroeconomic thought
  • Concluding remarks
  • Theoretical issues in modeling the Great Depression.