Justification logic : reasoning with reasons /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Artemov, S. N., author.
Imprint:Cambridge ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2019.
©2019
Description:xxi, 247 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.
Language:English
Series:Cambridge tracts in mathematics ; 216
Cambridge tracts in mathematics ; 216.
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11948484
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Other authors / contributors:Fitting, Melvin, 1942- author.
ISBN:9781108424912
1108424910
9781108661102
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 234-243) and index.
Summary:Classical logic is concerned, loosely, with the behavior of truths. Epistemic logic similarly is about the behavior of known or believed truths. Justification logic is a theory of reasoning that enables the tracking of evidence for statements and therefore provides a logical framework for the reliability of assertions. This book, the first in the area, is a systematic account of the subject, progressing from modal logic through to the establishment of an arithmetic interpretation of intuitionistic logic. The presentation is mathematically rigorous but in a style that will appeal to readers from a wide variety of areas to which the theory applies. These include mathematical logic, artificial intelligence, computer science, philosophical logic and epistemology, linguistics, and game theory.
Other form:ebook version : 9781108661102
Review by Choice Review

Where classical logic captures the relations between absolutely true propositions, various modal logics model the relations between propositions that we believe, know, or can prove. The statements in justification logics, a rather new subject, express not only propositions but also our reasons for them in their particular stated form. It could happen that, not seeing the logical equivalence of two statements, we believe one and not the other, but traditional modal logic cannot capture this. Justification logic, however, can, ascertaining that a reason to believe one statement only becomes a reason to believe the other in the presence of a reason for believing their equivalence. This has obvious application for artificial intelligence and philosophy, but authors Artemov (CUNY) and Fitting (emer., CUNY) explore this concept with a glamorous mathematical objective. Famed mathemetician Kurt Gödel could interpret intuitionist logic in a certain modal logic (S4), and could interpret a different modal logical (GL) in arithmetic, but failed to find an arithmetic interpretation of intuitionist logic. Justification logic now provides the bridge he sought between S4 and arithmetic. The authors pioneered the subject and between them own many of its major results; they also explain, and indeed sell it, very well. Summing Up: Recommended. All readership levels. --David V. Feldman, University of New Hampshire

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review