The Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology /
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| Imprint: | New York : Routledge, 2019. |
|---|---|
| Description: | 1 online resource. |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Routledge handbooks in philosophy Routledge handbooks in philosophy. |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | E-Resource Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11989699 |
Table of Contents:
- The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology- Front Cover; The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; PART I: EPISTEMIC VIRTUES: GENERAL STRUCTURE AND FEATURES; PART II: ANALYSES OF INDIVIDUAL EPISTEMIC VIRTUES; PART III: EPISTEMIC VIRTUES, KNOWLEDGE, AND UNDERSTANDING; PART IV: VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY: APPLICATION AND IMPACT; REFERENCES; PART I: EPISTEMIC VIRTUES: GENERAL STRUCTURE AND FEATURES; Chapter 1: Telic Virtue Epistemology; 1.1 A VIRTUE THEORETIC ACCOUNT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE; 1.2 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
- 1.3 JUDGMENT AND AGENCYChapter 2: Intellectual Virtues: Admirable Traits of Character; 2.1 ADMIRABLE HUMAN TRAITS; 2.2 THE COMPONENTS OF CHARACTER TRAITS; 2.3 INTELLECTUAL CHARACTER TRAITS AND EPISTEMOLOGY; Chapter 3: Do Epistemic Virtues Require a Motivation for Truth?; 3.1 WHY DO EPISTEMIC VIRTUES REQUIRE A MOTIVATION FOR TRUTH?; 3.2 EPISTEMIC AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY; 3.3 FOR THE SAKE OF TRUTH; 3.4 KNOWLEDGE, VIRTUE, AND EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY; 3.5 ANIMAL KNOWLEDGE; 3.6 PERCEPTION; 3.7 RESPONSIBILITY AND TRUTH-MOTIVATION: REFINING THE POSITION; 3.8 ACTION, KNOWLEDGE, AND RESPONSIBILITY
- 3.9 SOSA ON KNOWLEDGE, TRUTH-MOTIVATION, AND EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY3.10 SUMMARY; Chapter 4: The Role of Emotion in Intellectual Virtue; 4.1 GROUNDWORK; 4.2 EMOTIONS AS MOTIVATORS; 4.3 EMOTIONS AS ENABLING RELIABLE SUCCESS; Chapter 5: Are Epistemic Virtues a Kind of Skill?; 5.1 INTRODUCTION: TWO CONCEPTS OF SKILL-ABILITY AND TECHNEĢ; 5.2 VIRTUE RELIABILISM; 5.3 VIRTUE RESPONSIBILISM; 5.4 CONCLUSION AND FURTHER CONNECTIONS; Chapter 6: What Makes the Epistemic Virtues Valuable?; 6.1 THE EPISTEMIC VIRTUES; 6.2 SOME DISTINCTIONS IN VALUE; 6.3 WHAT MAKES THE EPISTEMIC VIRTUES VALUABLE?
- 6.4 CONCLUSIONChapter 7: Virtue Epistemology and the Sources of Epistemic Value; 7.1 THE ETHICS OF BELIEF: WHICH ETHICS?; 7.2 VIRTUE RELIABILISM AND RESPONSIBILISM; 7.3 PLURALISM AS DISTINCT FROM MIXED VIRTUES THEORY; 7.4 VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY DOES NOT PROVIDE A SUI GENERIS SOURCE OF EPISTEMIC VALUE; 7.5 WHAT MIGHT UNIFY AN ARETAIC AXIOLOGY?; 7.6 HALO EFFECTS AND THE RIGHT VERSUS THE GOOD; Chapter 8: Virtue Epistemology, Virtue Ethics, and the Structure of Virtue; 8.1 A CONSEQUENTIALIST ANALOGUE?; 8.2 A SENTIMENTALIST ANALOGUE?; 8.3 A RATIONALIST OR PERCEPTUAL ANALOGUE?
- 8.4 THE INTEGRATION OF FACULTY VIRTUES AND CHARACTER VIRTUES8.5 CONCLUSION; Chapter 9: Sentimentalist Virtue Epistemology: Beyond Responsibilism and Reliabilism; 9.1 RESPONSIBILISM AND SENTIMENTALISM; 9.2 RELIABILISM AND SENTIMENTALISM; 9.3 SENTIMENTALISM AND CHINESE PHILOSOPHY; Chapter 10: A Third Kind of Intellectual Virtue: Personalism; 10.1 RELIABILISM; 10.2 RESPONSIBILISM; 10.3 PERSONALISM; 10.4 OBJECTIONS AND PROJECTS; Chapter 11: There Are No Epistemic Virtues; 11.1 INTRODUCTION; 11.2 A DIFFICULTY ABOUT VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY; 11.3 A UNIFIED APPROACH TO VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY?
