How to count animals, more or less /

How to count animals, more or less /

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Kagan, Shelly, author.
Edition:First edition.
Imprint:Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2019.
©2019
Description:x, 309 pages : illustrations ; 22 cm.
Language:English
Series:Uehiro series in practical ethics
Uehiro series in practical ethics.
Subject:
Animals (Philosophy)
Animal welfare.
Human-animal relationships -- Moral and ethical aspects.
Hierarchies.
Animal welfare.
Animals (Philosophy)
Hierarchies.
Human-animal relationships -- Moral and ethical aspects.
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12009250
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:0198829671
9780198829676
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 305-306) and index.
Summary:Most people agree that animals count morally, but how exactly should we take animals into account? A prominent stance in contemporary ethical discussions is that animals have the same moral status that people do, and so in moral deliberation the similar interests of animals and people should be given the very same consideration. In 'How to Count Animals,' more or less, Shelly Kagan sets out and defends a hierarchical approach in which people count more than animals do and some animals count more than others. For the most part, moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take account of differences in status. By arguing for a hierarchical account of morality - and exploring what status sensitive principles might look like - Kagan reveals just how much work needs to be done to arrive at an adequate view of our uties toward animals, and of morality more generally. -- Publisher, page four of cover.
Table of Contents:
  • Acknowledgments
  • Introduction
  • 1. Standing
  • 1.1. Standing and Status
  • 1.2. Sentience
  • 1.3. Agency
  • 1.4. Agency without Sentience
  • 1.5. Welfare and Standing
  • 2. Unitarianism
  • 2.1. Unitarianism
  • 2.2. The Greater Harm
  • 2.3. Comparing Lives
  • 2.4. Hierarchy
  • 3. The Argument from Distribution
  • 3.1. Distributive Principles
  • 3.2. The Argument from Distribution
  • 3.3. Replies
  • 4. Hierarchy and the Value of Outcomes
  • 4.1. Hierarchy in Distribution
  • 4.2. Problems for Priority
  • 4.3. Well-Being
  • 4.4. Dismissing the View
  • 4.5. The Status Adjusted Value of Well-Being
  • 5. Status
  • 5.1. Grounds of Status
  • 5.2. Individualism
  • 5.3. Which Capacities?
  • 5.4. Potential
  • 5.5. Modal Status
  • 6. Worries about Hierarchy
  • 6.1. Elitism
  • 6.2. Superior Beings
  • 6.3. Marginal Cases
  • 6.4. Normal Variation
  • 7. Deontology
  • 7.1. Consequentialism and Deontology
  • 7.2. Absolutist Deontology
  • 7.3. Moderate Deontology
  • 7.4. Some Calculations
  • 8. Restricted Deontology
  • 8.1. Excluding Animals from Deontology
  • 8.2. Autonomy
  • 8.3. Resisting the Argument
  • 8.4. Dichotomous Properties
  • 9. Hierarchical Deontology
  • 9.1. Weaker Rights
  • 9.2. Thresholds
  • 9.3. Meeting the Threshold
  • 9.4. Other Principles
  • 10. Defense
  • 10.1. The Right to Self-Defense
  • 10.2. Defending Animals
  • 10.3. Defending Against Animals
  • 10.4. Defending Animals Against Animals
  • 10.5. More on Proportionality
  • 11. Limited Hierarchy
  • 11.1. A Suitable Step Function
  • 11.2. Practical Realism
  • 11.3. The View that Emerges
  • 11.4. Pretense
  • 11.5. How to Count Animals
  • References
  • Index
The Catherine Lindsay Dobson Book Fund bookplate

Similar Items