No miracles : the failure of Soviet decision-making in the Afghan War /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Fenzel, Michael R., author.
Imprint:Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, [2017]
©2017
Description:1 online resource (x, 180 pages)
Language:English
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12018088
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9780804799102
0804799105
9780804798181
0804798184
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Print version record.
Other form:Print version: Fenzel, Michael R. No miracles. Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, 2017 9780804798181
Table of Contents:
  • The Soviet failure in Afghanistan
  • Setting the stage : evolution of party-military relations
  • Getting in : Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan
  • No retreat ... no miracles : Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko in Afghanistan (1980-1985)
  • Gorbachev's quest for "reluctant, silent agreement" to withdraw from Afghanistan
  • Getting out : Gorbachev and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (1986-1989)
  • Losing Afghanistan.