Conventional realism and political inquiry : channeling Wittgenstein /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Gunnell, John G., author.
Imprint:Chicago, IL : The University of Chicago Press, 2020
©2020
Description:1 online resource (194 pages)
Language:English
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12022665
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9780226661308
022666130X
9780226661278
022666127X
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index
Description based on print version record
Summary:When social scientists and social theorists turn to the work of philosophers for intellectual and practical authority, they typically assume that truth, reality, and meaning are to be found outside rather than within our conventional discursive practices. John G. Gunnell argues for conventional realism as a theory of social phenomena and an approach to the study of politics. Drawing on Wittgenstein's critique of "mentalism" and traditional realism, Gunnell argues that everything we designate as "real" is rendered conventionally, which entails a rejection of the widely accepted distinction between what is natural and what is conventional. The terms "reality" and "world" have no meaning outside the contexts of specific claims and assumptions about what exists and how it behaves. And rather than a mysterious source and repository of prelinguistic meaning, the "mind" is simply our linguistic capacities. Taking readers through contemporary forms of mentalism and realism in both philosophy and American political science and theory, Gunnell also analyzes the philosophical challenges to these positions mounted by Wittgenstein and those who can be construed as his successors
Other form:Print version: Gunnell, John G. Conventional realism and political inquiry. Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, [2020] 9780226661278
Review by Choice Review

In his new book, Gunnell (emer., State Univ. of New York, Albany) targets two "phantoms" that have haunted political science in the US. The first is realism--the idea that there is a real world our words and ideas correspond to more or less well. The second is mentalism--the idea that words and ideas reflect states or phenomena of our mind. As Gunnell argues, the alternative to both is conventionalism, the idea that all human activity takes place within what Wittgenstein called a "form of life" made up of words, ideas, and what we do with them. The point is not to deny the existence of a world or our minds, but rather to understand that every theory about such things is what Gunnell calls a "presentation" of a (necessarily unprovable) view about reality, not a "representation" of its underlying, independent facts. Echoing his influential earlier work, Social Inquiry after Wittgenstein & Kuhn (CH, Jun'15, 52-5592), Gunnell shows how these phantoms came to dominate American political science, deftly summarizing much of 20th-century philosophy in the process, and he rebuts the widespread but false idea that conventionalism necessarily entails moral relativism. Possibly of interest to advanced undergraduates, this text will surely attract established and budding scholars of political science, political theory, and philosophy. Summing Up: Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduates. Graduate students, faculty, researchers. --Matthew J Moore, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review