Review by Choice Review
These three lectures (with formal appendixes) compose a slim first volume in the recently established series "The Rutgers Lectures in Philosophy." Fine (New York Univ.) systematically outlines a fresh approach to the problem of vagueness in advance of an extensive future publication discussing objections and replies to the topics summarized here. Unlike Roy Sorensen's Vagueness and Contradiction (CH, Oct'02, 40-0845), which views vagueness in terms of sharp divisions, and unlike Kees van Deemter's Not Exactly (CH, Sep'10, 48-0189), which views vagueness in terms of degrees or probabilities, Fine treats vagueness in terms of the relations of things. The first lecture introduces the three prevailing current approaches to vagueness in language, together with a brief description of their grave deficiencies. Fine's second lecture provides the heart of a novel account whereby vagueness is viewed as global indeterminacy rather than as a local or individual indeterminacy, an account especially formulated within a freshly developed semantics using non-classical logic. The final lecture exhibits how this account of vagueness can give insight into a variety of epistemological and metaphysical problems. Knowledge of beginning symbolic logic is helpful, but not essential, for a basic understanding of the lectures. Summing Up: Recommended. Upper-division undergraduates. Graduate students, faculty, and professionals. --Lee C. Archie, emeritus, Lander University
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review
