Deficit limits, budget rules, and fiscal policy /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Manasse, Paolo, author.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Dept., 2005.
Description:1 online resource (19 pages) : illustrations
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/05/120
IMF working paper ; WP/05/120.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12494847
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Department, issuing body.
ISBN:1283512866
9781283512862
9781451906752
1451906757
1462311490
9781462311491
1452720908
9781452720906
9786613825315
661382531X
Notes:"June 2005."
Includes bibliographical references (page 19).
English.
Online resource; title from title screen (viewed on October 15, 2013).
Summary:The paper presents a simple model for discussing the effects of deficit limits and budget rules on fiscal policy. I find that limits on deficit-output ratios provide incentives to implement procyclical policies when the economy is in intermediate states, and countercyclical policies only in very "good" and very "bad" economic times. As a result, fiscal "reaction functions" are not monotonically related to the state of the economy. Deficit limits are found to exert discipline only provided the limit is tight and the expected sanction large, albeit at a relatively large welfare cost. Moreover, when fiscal choices are made under a veil of ignorance about the output gap, an increase in volatility is likely to raise the level of the budget deficit. Finally, concerning the design of fiscal frameworks, when excessive deficits arise from a political bias, deficit limits should be symmetric and not state-contingent
Other form:Print version: Manasse, Paolo. Deficit limits, budget rules, and fiscal policy. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Dept., 2005

MARC

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245 1 0 |a Deficit limits, budget rules, and fiscal policy /  |c prepared by Paolo Manasse. 
260 |a [Washington, D.C.] :  |b International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Dept.,  |c 2005. 
300 |a 1 online resource (19 pages) :  |b illustrations 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/05/120 
588 0 |a Online resource; title from title screen (viewed on October 15, 2013). 
500 |a "June 2005." 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references (page 19). 
520 |a The paper presents a simple model for discussing the effects of deficit limits and budget rules on fiscal policy. I find that limits on deficit-output ratios provide incentives to implement procyclical policies when the economy is in intermediate states, and countercyclical policies only in very "good" and very "bad" economic times. As a result, fiscal "reaction functions" are not monotonically related to the state of the economy. Deficit limits are found to exert discipline only provided the limit is tight and the expected sanction large, albeit at a relatively large welfare cost. Moreover, when fiscal choices are made under a veil of ignorance about the output gap, an increase in volatility is likely to raise the level of the budget deficit. Finally, concerning the design of fiscal frameworks, when excessive deficits arise from a political bias, deficit limits should be symmetric and not state-contingent 
505 0 |a Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. A SIMPLE MODEL OF FISCAL POLICY -- III. DEFICIT LIMITS -- IV. CONCLUSIONS -- REFERENCES 
546 |a English. 
650 0 |a Fiscal policy  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Budget deficits  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Economic stabilization  |x Econometric models. 
650 6 |a Politique fiscale  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Déficit budgétaire  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Stabilisation économique  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 7 |a Budget deficits  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00840406 
650 7 |a Economic stabilization  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00902087 
650 7 |a Fiscal policy  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00925810 
655 4 |a Electronic books. 
710 2 |a International Monetary Fund.  |b Fiscal Affairs Department,  |e issuing body.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n81027435 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Manasse, Paolo.  |t Deficit limits, budget rules, and fiscal policy.  |d [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Dept., 2005  |w (OCoLC)61132225 
830 0 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/05/120.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no89010263 
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