Financial stability and fiscal crises in a monetary union /

Financial stability and fiscal crises in a monetary union /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Jahjah, Samir.
Imprint:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2001.
Description:	1 online resource (25 pages) : illustrations
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/01/201 IMF working paper ; WP/01/201.
Subject:	Monetary policy -- Econometric models. Debts, Public -- Econometric models. Inflation (Finance) -- Econometric models. Default (Finance) -- Econometric models. Risk -- Econometric models. Monetary unions -- Econometric models. Debts, Public -- Econometric models. Default (Finance) -- Econometric models. Inflation (Finance) -- Econometric models. Monetary policy -- Econometric models. Monetary unions -- Econometric models. Risk -- Econometric models.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12496087

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	International Monetary Fund. IMF Institute.
ISBN:	1283516616 9781283516617 9781451918939 1451918933 146239910X 9781462399109 1452748020 9781452748023 9786613829061 6613829064
Notes:	Cover title. "December 2001"--Page 1 At head of title: IMF Institute. Includes bibliographical references (pages 22-25). Restrictions unspecified Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 English. digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve Print version record.
Summary:	The main tasks of central banks are to secure price and financial stability. These objectives can, in times of crises, conflict with one another, and the central bank may have to renounce one of them in order to secure the other. In a monetary union, this trade-off can be exacerbated by the presence of highly indebted countries or by the risk of loose fiscal policies. This paper offers a simple theoretical model that captures the trade-off. Different fiscal institutions are compared in order to evaluate their impact on the conduct of monetary policy. More specifically, the fiscal criteria of the Maastricht Treaty and the Pact for Stability and Growth in Europe are analyzed in light of this model. Fiscal mechanisms exist to help prevent or minimize the risk of fiscal crises and the corresponding risk of central bank financing and inflation.
Other form:	Print version: Jahjah, Samir. Financial stability and fiscal crises in a monetary union. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2001
Standard no.:	10.5089/9781451918939.001

Description
Summary:	The main tasks of central banks are to secure price and financial stability. These objectives can, in times of crises, conflict with one another, and the central bank may have to renounce one of them in order to secure the other. In a monetary union, this trade-off can be exacerbated by the presence of highly indebted countries or by the risk of loose fiscal policies. This paper offers a simple theoretical model that captures the trade-off. Different fiscal institutions are compared in order to evaluate their impact on the conduct of monetary policy. More specifically, the fiscal criteria of the Maastricht Treaty and the Pact for Stability and Growth in Europe are analyzed in light of this model. Fiscal mechanisms exist to help prevent or minimize the risk of fiscal crises and the corresponding risk of central bank financing and inflation.
Item Description:	Cover title. "December 2001"--Page 1 At head of title: IMF Institute.
Physical Description:	1 online resource (25 pages) : illustrations
Format:	Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Bibliography:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 22-25).
ISBN:	1283516616 9781283516617 9781451918939 1451918933 146239910X 9781462399109 1452748020 9781452748023 9786613829061 6613829064
ISSN:	2227-8885 ;