Implementing the stability and growth pact : enforcement and procedural flexibility /

Implementing the stability and growth pact : enforcement and procedural flexibility /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Beetsma, Roel M. W. J., author.
Imprint:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2005.
Description:	1 online resource (34 pages)
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/05/59 IMF working paper ; WP/05/59.
Subject:	Fiscal policy -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. Monetary policy -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. Budget deficits -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. Structural adjustment (Economic policy) -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. Budget deficits -- Econometric models. Fiscal policy -- Econometric models. Monetary policy -- Econometric models. Structural adjustment (Economic policy) -- Econometric models. European Union countries. Electronic books.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12496132

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	Debrun, Xavier, author. International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Department, issuing body.
ISBN:	9781451906141 1451906145 1462398278 9781462398270 1452729999 9781452729992 1282110357 9781282110359 9786613803245 6613803243
Notes:	Restrictions unspecified Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 English. digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve Print version record.
Summary:	The paper analyzes some key policy trade-offs involved in the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. Greater "procedural" flexibility in the Pact's implementation may improve welfare. Procedural flexibility designates the enforcer's room to apply judgment on underlying policies and to set a consolidation path that does not discourage high-quality measures. Budgetary opaqueness may hinder the qualitative assessment of fiscal policy; therefore, better monitoring and greater transparency would increase the benefits from procedural flexibility. Overall, a simple deficit rule with conditional procedural flexibility can contain excessive deficits, lower unproductive spending, and increase high-quality outlays.
Other form:	Print version: Beetsma, Roel M.W.J. Implementing the stability and growth pact. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2005
Standard no.:	10.5089/9781451906141.001

Table of Contents:

Contents
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE MODEL
III. OPTIMAL PACT UNDER BUDGETARY TRANSPARENCY AND NO PORK-BARREL
IV. LIMITED AMENDMENTS TO SUBOPTIMAL FISCAL PACTS
V. BUDGETARY OPAQUENESS
VI. CONCLUSIONS
References