Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | International Monetary Fund. Research Department.
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| ISBN: | 145189869X
9781451898699
1452777489
9781452777481
1282111841
9781282111844
9786613804037
6613804037
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references (page 29).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
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| Summary: | The paper suggests that when firms differ stochastically in their productivity, a bank may find it optimal not to bail out the failed nonconglomerate firms at all, but to bail out conglomerates fully. Expectation of such bailout policy may encourage risk-averse firms to join a conglomerate to minimize the risk of liquidation. Furthermore, in case of private information, bad firms follow good firms' decision on conglomeration to hide their type. Finally, the paper discusses the impact of conglomeration on the debt-equity ratio and the expansion of existing conglomerates through mergers and acquisitions.
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| Other form: | Print version: Kim, Se-Jik, 1960- Bailout and conglomeration. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Research Department, ©1999
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| Standard no.: | 10.5089/9781451898699.001
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