Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | Svensson, Lars E. O., author.
International Monetary Fund. Research Department, issuing body.
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| ISBN: | 1451903065
9781451903065
9781451857900
145185790X
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| ISSN: | 2227-8885
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references.
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [S.l.] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
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| Summary: | An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation. This commitment mechanism works even though, realistically, the central bank cannot commit itself to a particular future money supply. It supports the feasibility of Svensson's Foolproof Way to escape from a liquidity trap.
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| Other form: | Print version: Jeanne, Olivier. Credible commitment to optimal escape from a liquidity trap. [Washington D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2004
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| Standard no.: | 10.5089/9781451903065.001
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