Credible commitment to optimal escape from a liquidity trap : the role of the balance sheet of an independent central bank /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Jeanne, Olivier, author.
Imprint:[Washington D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2004.
Description:1 online resource (43 pages) : illustrations.
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/04/162
IMF working paper ; WP/04/162.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12496355
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Other authors / contributors:Svensson, Lars E. O., author.
International Monetary Fund. Research Department, issuing body.
ISBN:1451903065
9781451903065
9781451857900
145185790X
ISSN:2227-8885
Notes:Includes bibliographical references.
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [S.l.] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
Summary:An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation. This commitment mechanism works even though, realistically, the central bank cannot commit itself to a particular future money supply. It supports the feasibility of Svensson's Foolproof Way to escape from a liquidity trap.
Other form:Print version: Jeanne, Olivier. Credible commitment to optimal escape from a liquidity trap. [Washington D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2004
Standard no.:10.5089/9781451903065.001