Wage centralization, union bargaining, and macroeconomic performance /

Wage centralization, union bargaining, and macroeconomic performance /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	McHugh, James.
Imprint:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2002.
Description:	1 online resource (26 pages) : illustrations
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/02/143 IMF working paper ; WP/02/143.
Subject:	Labor market -- Econometric models. Labor unions -- Econometric models. Wages -- Econometric models. Collective bargaining -- Econometric models. Industrial relations -- Econometric models. Industrial productivity -- Econometric models. Collective bargaining -- Econometric models. Industrial productivity -- Econometric models. Industrial relations -- Econometric models. Labor market -- Econometric models. Wages -- Econometric models.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12496547

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	International Monetary Fund. European I Department.
ISBN:	1451901526 9781451901528 1462383181 9781462383184 1452784515 9781452784519 1282056662 9781282056664 9786613798619 6613798614
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 25-26). Restrictions unspecified Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 English. digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve Print version record.
Summary:	This paper addresses two questions. First, under what circumstances will a centralized wage-bargaining system offer higher output and employment than a decentralized system? Second, what is the relationship between the degree of wage centralization and inflation? The paper argues that centralized wage setting may offer worse outcomes, despite the existence of a negative coordination externality in decentralized wage setting. This is more likely to occur when the legal and institutional environment strengthens the bargaining position of the union in the centralized regime compared with unions operating in a more decentralized regime. Furthermore, as product markets become more competitive, the macroeconomic outcomes in both regimes converge, and the degree of wage centralization becomes irrelevant.
Other form:	Print version: McHugh, James. Wage centralization, union bargaining, and macroeconomic performance. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2002
Standard no.:	10.5089/9781451901528.001

Description
Summary:	This paper addresses two questions. First, under what circumstances will a centralized wage-bargaining system offer higher output and employment than a decentralized system? Second, what is the relationship between the degree of wage centralization and inflation? The paper argues that centralized wage setting may offer worse outcomes, despite the existence of a negative coordination externality in decentralized wage setting. This is more likely to occur when the legal and institutional environment strengthens the bargaining position of the union in the centralized regime compared with unions operating in a more decentralized regime. Furthermore, as product markets become more competitive, the macroeconomic outcomes in both regimes converge, and the degree of wage centralization becomes irrelevant.
Physical Description:	1 online resource (26 pages) : illustrations
Format:	Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Bibliography:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 25-26).
ISBN:	1451901526 9781451901528 1462383181 9781462383184 1452784515 9781452784519 1282056662 9781282056664 9786613798619 6613798614
ISSN:	2227-8885 ;