Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | Le Borgne, Eric, author.
International Monetary Fund. Research Department.
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| ISBN: | 1282044338
9781282044333
9781451901610
1451901615
1462371078
9781462371075
1452792593
9781452792590
9786613797476
6613797472
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| Notes: | "July 2003."
At head of title: Research Dept., Research Department.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 43-44).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
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| Summary: | We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dynamic "New-Keynesian" stochastic general equilibrium model. This model gives a new theory of central bank independence that is unrelated to the standard inflation bias problem. We derive several new predictions and show that they are consistent with the data. Finally, we show that while instrument independence of the central bank is desirable, goal independence is not
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| Other form: | Print version: Eggertsson, Gauti B. Political agency theory of central bank independence. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, ©2003
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