A political agency theory of central bank independence /
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| Author / Creator: | Eggertsson, Gauti B., author. |
|---|---|
| Imprint: | Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, ©2003. |
| Description: | 1 online resource (44 pages) |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | IMF working paper ; WP/03/144 IMF working paper ; WP/03/144. |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | E-Resource Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12496553 |
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| 050 | 4 | |a HG3881.5.I58 |b W67 no.03/144 | |
| 100 | 1 | |a Eggertsson, Gauti B., |e author. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2003057560 | |
| 245 | 1 | 2 | |a A political agency theory of central bank independence / |c Gauti Eggertsson and Eric Le Borgne. |
| 260 | |a Washington, D.C. : |b International Monetary Fund, |c ©2003. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (44 pages) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a IMF working paper ; |v WP/03/144 | |
| 500 | |a "July 2003." | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 43-44). | ||
| 500 | |a At head of title: Research Dept., Research Department. | ||
| 506 | |3 Use copy |f Restrictions unspecified |2 star |5 MiAaHDL | ||
| 533 | |a Electronic reproduction. |b [Place of publication not identified] : |c HathiTrust Digital Library, |d 2010. |5 MiAaHDL | ||
| 538 | |a Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. |u http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 |5 MiAaHDL | ||
| 583 | 1 | |a digitized |c 2010 |h HathiTrust Digital Library |l committed to preserve |2 pda |5 MiAaHDL | |
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 520 | |a We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dynamic "New-Keynesian" stochastic general equilibrium model. This model gives a new theory of central bank independence that is unrelated to the standard inflation bias problem. We derive several new predictions and show that they are consistent with the data. Finally, we show that while instrument independence of the central bank is desirable, goal independence is not | ||
| 546 | |a English. | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Banks and banking, Central |x Econometric models. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Monetary policy |x Econometric models. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Bank management |x Econometric models. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Banques centrales |x Modèles économétriques. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Politique monétaire |x Modèles économétriques. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Banques |x Gestion |x Modèles économétriques. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Bank management |x Econometric models. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst00826733 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Banks and banking, Central |x Econometric models. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst00827041 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Monetary policy |x Econometric models. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst01025234 | |
| 655 | 4 | |a Electronic books. | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Le Borgne, Eric, |e author. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2002030268 | |
| 710 | 2 | |a International Monetary Fund. |b Research Department. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n77001219 | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Eggertsson, Gauti B. |t Political agency theory of central bank independence. |d Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, ©2003 |w (OCoLC)52996185 |
| 830 | 0 | |a IMF working paper ; |v WP/03/144. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no89010263 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2003/144/001.2003.issue-144-en.xml |y INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND |
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| 928 | |t Library of Congress classification |a HG3881.5.I58W67 no.03/144 |l Online |c UC-FullText |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2003/144/001.2003.issue-144-en.xml |z INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND |g ebooks |i 12140582 | ||