Structuring and restructuring sovereign debt : the role of a bankruptcy regime /

Structuring and restructuring sovereign debt : the role of a bankruptcy regime /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Bolton, Patrick, 1957- author.
Imprint:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Research Dept., ©2007.
Description:	1 online resource (27 pages) : illustrations
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/07/192 IMF working paper ; WP/07/192.
Subject:	Debt relief -- Econometric models. Debts, External -- Econometric models. Bankruptcy -- Econometric models. Bankruptcy -- Econometric models. Debt relief -- Econometric models. Debts, External -- Econometric models.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12496636

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	Jeanne, Olivier, author. International Monetary Fund. Research Department.
ISBN:	1282391941 9781282391949 1451912099 9781451912098
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 24-26). Restrictions unspecified Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve Print version record.
Summary:	In an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement, sovereign lenders can enhance the likelihood of repayment by making their claims more difficult to restructure ex post. We show however, that competition for repayment among lenders may result in a sovereign debt that is excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium. This inefficiency may be alleviated by a suitably designed bankruptcy regime that facilitates debt restructuring.
Other form:	Print version: Bolton, Patrick, 1957- Structuring and restructuring sovereign debt. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Research Dept., ©2007
Standard no.:	10.5089/9781451912098.001

Description
Summary:	In an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement, sovereign lenders can enhance the likelihood of repayment by making their claims more difficult to restructure ex post. We show however, that competition for repayment among lenders may result in a sovereign debt that is excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium. This inefficiency may be alleviated by a suitably designed bankruptcy regime that facilitates debt restructuring.
Physical Description:	1 online resource (27 pages) : illustrations
Format:	Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Bibliography:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 24-26).
ISBN:	1282391941 9781282391949 1451912099 9781451912098
ISSN:	2227-8885 ;