Government Ponzi games and debt dynamics under uncertainty /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Bartolini, Leonardo, author.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.?] : International Monetary Fund, European Department, 1991.
Description:1 online resource (iii, 18 pages) : illustrations.
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/91/126
IMF working paper ; WP/91/126.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12496669
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Cottarelli, Carlo, author.
International Monetary Fund. Research Department, issuing body.
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 17-18).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [S.l.] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
Summary:Annotation We investigate the conditions for sustainability of debt roll-over schemes under uncertainty. In contrast with the requirements identified in recent research, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for sustainability of such schemes is that the asymptotic interest rate on government debt be lower than the asymptotic growth rate of the economy, a natural extension of a familiar criterion in a deterministic framework. However, we also show that for realistic parameter values, Ponzi games that are sustainable in the long run may display explosive patterns over relatively long horizons. This may explain why governments may be reluctant to play Ponzi games even when they are feasible in the long run.
Other form:Print version: Bartolini, Leonardo. Government Ponzi games and debt dynamics under uncertainty. [Washington, D.C.?] : International Monetary Fund, European Dept., 1991

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520 8 |a Annotation  |b We investigate the conditions for sustainability of debt roll-over schemes under uncertainty. In contrast with the requirements identified in recent research, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for sustainability of such schemes is that the asymptotic interest rate on government debt be lower than the asymptotic growth rate of the economy, a natural extension of a familiar criterion in a deterministic framework. However, we also show that for realistic parameter values, Ponzi games that are sustainable in the long run may display explosive patterns over relatively long horizons. This may explain why governments may be reluctant to play Ponzi games even when they are feasible in the long run. 
650 0 |a Deficit financing  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Debts, External.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85036140 
650 6 |a Dettes extérieures. 
650 6 |a Financement par le déficit  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 7 |a Debts, External.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00888828 
650 7 |a Deficit financing  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00889733 
700 1 |a Cottarelli, Carlo,  |e author.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n90609163 
710 2 |a International Monetary Fund.  |b Research Department,  |e issuing body.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n77001219 
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