Competition among regulators /

Competition among regulators /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni.
Imprint:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Research Dept., ©2001.
Description:	1 online resource (24 pages)
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper ; WP/01/73 IMF working paper ; WP/01/73.
Subject:	Banking law -- Econometric models. Externalities (Economics) -- Econometric models. Competition -- Econometric models. Competition -- Econometric models. Externalities (Economics) -- Econometric models.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12496797

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	Marquez, Robert, 1968- International Monetary Fund. Research Department.
ISBN:	1451895917 9781451895919 1281600938 9781281600936
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 23-24). Restrictions unspecified Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve Print version record.
Summary:	In recent years, technological progress and regulatory changes have led to the progressive integration of international financial markets. In that context, banks' cross-border activities have become increasingly important, raising new problems for regulators that have remained nationally bounded. This trend has spurred a debate on the costs and benefits of the international harmonization of bank regulation. As a specific example, in the EU the introduction of the Euro and the single market have raised the question of whether a continental regulatory agency would be necessary or desirable.
Other form:	Print version: Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni. Competition among regulators. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Research Dept., ©2001

Description
Summary:	This paper shows that competition among regulators reduces regulatory standards relative to a centralized solution. It suggests that a central regulator is more likely to emerge for homogeneous and financially integrated countries. The paper proves these results in a model where regulators concerned with their banking system's stability and efficiency and with their banks' profitability set their regulatory policy non-cooperatively. Externalities in bank regulation make the independent solution collectively inefficient. These externalities and the benefits of centralized regulation increase with financial integration, while the costs associated with the loss of independence decrease with the homogeneity of the countries involved.
Physical Description:	1 online resource (24 pages)
Format:	Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Bibliography:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 23-24).
ISBN:	1451895917 9781451895919 1281600938 9781281600936