Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | International Monetary Fund. Research Department.
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| ISBN: | 1451900813
9781451900811
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 23-24).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
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| Summary: | This paper compares the restructuring of sovereign bonds with and without collective action clauses. One conclusion is that collective action clauses can allow efficient debt renegotiation in a formal model of sovereign debt renegotiation while unanimity rules offer incentives for opportunistic behavior by bondholders that leads to inefficient outcomes. With collective action clauses, the mutual gains from renegotiation can be internalized by bondholders so that the holders of each bond issue have incentives to participate in a collective debt restructuring. The analysis abstracts from transactions costs, and the last conclusion might well be sensitive to renegotiation and coordination costs.
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| Other form: | Print version: Kletzer, Kenneth. Sovereign bond restructuring. Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund, ©2003
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| Standard no.: | 10.5089/9781451900811.001
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