Helping hand or grabbing hand? : supervisory architecture, financial structure and market view /

Helping hand or grabbing hand? : supervisory architecture, financial structure and market view /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Masciandaro, Donato, 1961- author.
Imprint:	Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, 2008.
Description:	1 online resource (46 pages) : illustrations
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper ; WP/08/47 IMF working paper ; WP/08/47.
Subject:	Financial institutions -- State supervision. Banks and banking -- State supervision. Banks and banking -- State supervision -- Italy. Banks and banking -- State supervision. Financial institutions -- State supervision. Italy.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12496851

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	Quintyn, Marc, author. IMF Institute. International Monetary Fund.
ISBN:	1283516330 9781283516334
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 20-23). Restrictions unspecified Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve Print version record.
Summary:	The literature stresses the importance of financial market characteristics in determining the supervisory architectures. In the real world it is not always clear to what extent market features are taken into account. We present two complementary approaches to gain insights in the above relationship. First, an empirical test of two theories-the helping and the grabbing hand view of government-seems more consistent with the latter, presuming the market demonstrates a preference for consolidation of supervisory powers. Second, a survey among financial CEOs in Italy confirms a preference for a consolidated supervisory regime and reveals only weak consistency between the views of the policymakers and the market operators.
Other form:	Print version: Masciandaro, Donato, 1961- Helping hand or grabbing hand?. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, 2008

Description
Summary:	The literature stresses the importance of financial market characteristics in determining the supervisory architectures. In the real world it is not always clear to what extent market features are taken into account. We present two complementary approaches to gain insights in the above relationship. First, an empirical test of two theories-the helping and the grabbing hand view of government-seems more consistent with the latter, presuming the market demonstrates a preference for consolidation of supervisory powers. Second, a survey among financial CEOs in Italy confirms a preference for a consolidated supervisory regime and reveals only weak consistency between the views of the policymakers and the market operators.
Physical Description:	1 online resource (46 pages) : illustrations
Format:	Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Bibliography:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 20-23).
ISBN:	1283516330 9781283516334