Macroeconomic management and the devolution of fiscal powers /

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Drummond, Paulo Flavio Nacif, 1966-
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2002.
Description:1 online resource (45 pages) : illustrations
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/02/76
IMF working paper ; WP/02/76.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12496988
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Mansoor, Ali M.
International Monetary Fund. European I Department.
International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Department.
ISBN:1451896166
9781451896169
1281331430
9781281331434
146230155X
9781462301553
1451994524
9781451994520
9786613778826
6613778826
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 43-45).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
Summary:Several of the transition economies are devolving fiscal authority to subnational governments at a time when it is also important to consolidate fiscal policy. This can be problematic because, without appropriate care, the central government's ability to determine the level and structure of revenues, public spending, and borrowing may well diminish as fiscal policy is devolved. This paper focuses on how the center can maintain its ability to conduct fiscal policy while devolving revenue, spending, and borrowing powers to lower levels of government. Empirical evidence shows that countries with good governance have maintained fiscal control despite a high degree of fiscal devolution. and decentralization is associated with better fiscal outcomes for middle-income countries with strong governance. Fiscal management issues are explored in four key areas: budget coordination mechanisms at the macro level tax-effort incentives and revenue-sharing mechanisms expenditure control and hard-budget constraints and criteria and rules for borrowing.
Other form:Print version: Drummond, Paulo Flavio Nacif, 1966- Macroeconomic management and the devolution of fiscal powers. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2002
Description
Summary:Several of the transition economies are devolving fiscal authority to subnational governments at a time when it is also important to consolidate fiscal policy. This can be problematic because, without appropriate care, the central government's ability to determine the level and structure of revenues, public spending, and borrowing may well diminish as fiscal policy is devolved. This paper focuses on how the center can maintain its ability to conduct fiscal policy while devolving revenue, spending, and borrowing powers to lower levels of government. Empirical evidence shows that countries with good governance have maintained fiscal control despite a high degree of fiscal devolution. And decentralization is associated with better fiscal outcomes for middle-income countries with strong governance. Fiscal management issues are explored in four key areas: budget coordination mechanisms at the macro level tax-effort incentives and revenue-sharing mechanisms expenditure control and hard-budget constraints and criteria and rules for borrowing.
Physical Description:1 online resource (45 pages) : illustrations
Format:Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references (pages 43-45).
ISBN:1451896166
9781451896169
1281331430
9781281331434
146230155X
9781462301553
1451994524
9781451994520
9786613778826
6613778826