Macroeconomic management and the devolution of fiscal powers /
Saved in:
Author / Creator: | Drummond, Paulo Flavio Nacif, 1966- |
---|---|
Imprint: | [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2002. |
Description: | 1 online resource (45 pages) : illustrations |
Language: | English |
Series: | IMF working paper ; WP/02/76 IMF working paper ; WP/02/76. |
Subject: | |
Format: | E-Resource Book |
URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12496988 |
Summary: | Several of the transition economies are devolving fiscal authority to subnational governments at a time when it is also important to consolidate fiscal policy. This can be problematic because, without appropriate care, the central government's ability to determine the level and structure of revenues, public spending, and borrowing may well diminish as fiscal policy is devolved. This paper focuses on how the center can maintain its ability to conduct fiscal policy while devolving revenue, spending, and borrowing powers to lower levels of government. Empirical evidence shows that countries with good governance have maintained fiscal control despite a high degree of fiscal devolution. And decentralization is associated with better fiscal outcomes for middle-income countries with strong governance. Fiscal management issues are explored in four key areas: budget coordination mechanisms at the macro level tax-effort incentives and revenue-sharing mechanisms expenditure control and hard-budget constraints and criteria and rules for borrowing. |
---|---|
Physical Description: | 1 online resource (45 pages) : illustrations |
Format: | Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. |
Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 43-45). |
ISBN: | 1451896166 9781451896169 1281331430 9781281331434 146230155X 9781462301553 1451994524 9781451994520 9786613778826 6613778826 |