Financial globalization and the governance of domestic financial intermediaries /

Financial globalization and the governance of domestic financial intermediaries /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Tressel, Thierry.
Imprint:	Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, ©2007.
Description:	1 online resource (57 pages) : illustrations
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper ; WP/07/47.
Subject:	Banks and banking -- State supervision -- Econometric models. Capital movements -- Econometric models. Bank failures -- Econometric models. Globalization -- Econometric models. Banks and banking. Finance. Bank failures -- Econometric models. Capital movements -- Econometric models. Electronic books.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12497139

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	Verdier, Thierry. International Monetary Fund. Research Department.
ISBN:	1282391992 9781282391994 9781451910643 1451910649 1462357857 9781462357857 1452776369 9781452776361 9786613820426 6613820423
Notes:	"March 2007." At head of title: Research Department. Includes bibliographical references (pages 54-57). Restrictions unspecified Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 English. digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve Print version record.
Summary:	We model an economy in which domestic banks and firms face incentive constraints, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Firms borrow from banks and uninformed investors, and can collude with banks to reduce the intensity of monitoring. We study the general equilibrium effects of capital flows (portfolio investments and loans, FDI) on the governance of domestic banks. We find that liberalization of capital flows may deteriorate the governance of the domestic financial system by increasing firms' incentives to collude with banks, with negative effects on productivity. We also show that systemic bailout guarantees increase the risks of collusion.
Other form:	Print version: Tressel, Thierry. Financial globalization and the governance of domestic financial intermediaries. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, ©2007
Standard no.:	10.5089/9781451910643.001

Description
Summary:	We model an economy in which domestic banks and firms face incentive constraints, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Firms borrow from banks and uninformed investors, and can collude with banks to reduce the intensity of monitoring. We study the general equilibrium effects of capital flows (portfolio investments and loans, FDI) on the governance of domestic banks. We find that liberalization of capital flows may deteriorate the governance of the domestic financial system by increasing firms' incentives to collude with banks, with negative effects on productivity. We also show that systemic bailout guarantees increase the risks of collusion.
Item Description:	"March 2007." At head of title: Research Department.
Physical Description:	1 online resource (57 pages) : illustrations
Format:	Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Bibliography:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 54-57).
ISBN:	1282391992 9781282391994 9781451910643 1451910649 1462357857 9781462357857 1452776369 9781452776361 9786613820426 6613820423