Financial globalization and the governance of domestic financial intermediaries /

Financial globalization and the governance of domestic financial intermediaries /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Tressel, Thierry.
Imprint:Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, ©2007.
Description:1 online resource (57 pages) : illustrations
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/07/47.
Subject:
Banks and banking -- State supervision -- Econometric models.
Capital movements -- Econometric models.
Bank failures -- Econometric models.
Globalization -- Econometric models.
Banks and banking.
Finance.
Bank failures -- Econometric models.
Capital movements -- Econometric models.
Electronic books.
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12497139
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Verdier, Thierry.
International Monetary Fund. Research Department.
ISBN:1282391992
9781282391994
9781451910643
1451910649
1462357857
9781462357857
1452776369
9781452776361
9786613820426
6613820423
Notes:"March 2007."
At head of title: Research Department.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 54-57).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
Summary:We model an economy in which domestic banks and firms face incentive constraints, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Firms borrow from banks and uninformed investors, and can collude with banks to reduce the intensity of monitoring. We study the general equilibrium effects of capital flows (portfolio investments and loans, FDI) on the governance of domestic banks. We find that liberalization of capital flows may deteriorate the governance of the domestic financial system by increasing firms' incentives to collude with banks, with negative effects on productivity. We also show that systemic bailout guarantees increase the risks of collusion.
Other form:Print version: Tressel, Thierry. Financial globalization and the governance of domestic financial intermediaries. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, ©2007
Standard no.:10.5089/9781451910643.001
Table of Contents:
  • I. Introduction; II. Literature Review; III. Structure of the Model; A. Production Technology; B. Financial Intermediaries; C. Uninformed Investors; D. Collusion; IV. Firms' Financial Contracts; A. Incentive and Participation Constraints; B. The Borrower's Maximization Program; C. Project Size; D. When Does Partial Collusion Occur?; V. General Equilibrium; A. Occupational Choices and Equilibrium on the Markets for Domestic Capital; B. Existence of a Mixed Equilibrium; Figures; 1. Equilibrium Rate of Return on Informed Capital.
  • VI. Liberalization of International Portfolio Investment and Bank Borrowing2. Equilibrium Size of Informed Capital; VII. The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment; A. Foreign Direct Investment in the Corporate Sector; 3. Impact of Capital Flows on Investment, Productivity and Output; 4a. Impact of FDI on the Cost of Bank Capital; B. Foreign Investment in the Banking Sector; 4b. Impact of FDI on Output; 5a. Foreign Bank Entry (High Costs of Collusion); 5b. Foreign Bank Entry (Low Costs of Collusion); VIII. The Destabilizing Effect of Systemic Bailout Guarantees.
  • 6. Foreign Bank Entry with Heterogenous FirmsIX. Conclusion; 7. The Impact of Bailout Guarantees; Appendix; References.

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