Fiscal indulgence in Central Europe : loss of the external anchor? /

Fiscal indulgence in Central Europe : loss of the external anchor? /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Berger, Helge, author.
Imprint:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2004.
Description:	1 online resource (22 pages) : illustrations
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper ; WP/04/62 IMF working paper ; WP/04/62.
Subject:	European Union -- Membership. European Union. Fiscal policy -- Europe, Central. Fiscal policy -- Europe, Eastern. Game theory. Game Theory Game theory. Economic history. Fiscal policy. Membership requirements. Europe, Central -- Economic conditions. Europe, Eastern -- Economic conditions -- 1989- Central Europe. Eastern Europe. Electronic books.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12497541

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	Kopits, George, author. Székely, István P., 1959- author. International Monetary Fund. European Department, issuing body. International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Department, issuing body.
ISBN:	1451895054 9781451895056 1281430587 9781281430588 1462371191 9781462371198 1452717982 9781452717982 9786613780423 6613780421
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 21-22). Restrictions unspecified Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 English. digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve Print version record.
Summary:	In recent years, fiscal performance in Central Europe has steadily deteriorated, in contrast to the improvement in the Baltics. This paper explores the determinants of such differences among countries slated for EU accession. Regression estimates suggest that economic and institutional fundamentals do not provide a full explanation. An alternative explanation lies in the political economy of the accession process, and a game-theoretic model illustrates why a country with a stronger bargaining position might have an incentive to deviate from convergence to the Maastricht criteria. The model generates alternative fiscal policy regimes-allowing for regime shifts-depending on country characteristics and EU policies.
Other form:	Print version: Berger, Helge. Fiscal indulgence in Central Europe. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2004

Description
Summary:	In recent years, fiscal performance in Central Europe has steadily deteriorated, in contrast to the improvement in the Baltics. This paper explores the determinants of such differences among countries slated for EU accession. Regression estimates suggest that economic and institutional fundamentals do not provide a full explanation. An alternative explanation lies in the political economy of the accession process, and a game-theoretic model illustrates why a country with a stronger bargaining position might have an incentive to deviate from convergence to the Maastricht criteria. The model generates alternative fiscal policy regimes-allowing for regime shifts-depending on country characteristics and EU policies.
Physical Description:	1 online resource (22 pages) : illustrations
Format:	Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Bibliography:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 21-22).
ISBN:	1451895054 9781451895056 1281430587 9781281430588 1462371191 9781462371198 1452717982 9781452717982 9786613780423 6613780421