Fiscal indulgence in Central Europe : loss of the external anchor? /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Berger, Helge, author.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2004.
Description:1 online resource (22 pages) : illustrations
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/04/62
IMF working paper ; WP/04/62.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12497541
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Kopits, George, author.
Székely, István P., 1959- author.
International Monetary Fund. European Department, issuing body.
International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Department, issuing body.
ISBN:1451895054
9781451895056
1281430587
9781281430588
1462371191
9781462371198
1452717982
9781452717982
9786613780423
6613780421
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 21-22).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
Summary:In recent years, fiscal performance in Central Europe has steadily deteriorated, in contrast to the improvement in the Baltics. This paper explores the determinants of such differences among countries slated for EU accession. Regression estimates suggest that economic and institutional fundamentals do not provide a full explanation. An alternative explanation lies in the political economy of the accession process, and a game-theoretic model illustrates why a country with a stronger bargaining position might have an incentive to deviate from convergence to the Maastricht criteria. The model generates alternative fiscal policy regimes-allowing for regime shifts-depending on country characteristics and EU policies.
Other form:Print version: Berger, Helge. Fiscal indulgence in Central Europe. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2004

MARC

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245 1 0 |a Fiscal indulgence in Central Europe :  |b loss of the external anchor? /  |c prepared by Helge Berger, George Kopits, and István P. Székely. 
260 |a [Washington, D.C.] :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c ©2004. 
300 |a 1 online resource (22 pages) :  |b illustrations 
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504 |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 21-22). 
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520 |a In recent years, fiscal performance in Central Europe has steadily deteriorated, in contrast to the improvement in the Baltics. This paper explores the determinants of such differences among countries slated for EU accession. Regression estimates suggest that economic and institutional fundamentals do not provide a full explanation. An alternative explanation lies in the political economy of the accession process, and a game-theoretic model illustrates why a country with a stronger bargaining position might have an incentive to deviate from convergence to the Maastricht criteria. The model generates alternative fiscal policy regimes-allowing for regime shifts-depending on country characteristics and EU policies. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
505 0 |a Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. FISCAL PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL DETERMINANTS -- III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS -- IV. EXTERNAL ANCHOR: FISCAL STRATEGIES IN THE EU ACCESSION -- V. A GAME- THEORETIC APPROACH -- A. Analytical Framework -- B. Policy Decisions -- C. Implications -- VI. CONCLUSIONS -- REFERENCES 
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700 1 |a Székely, István P.,  |d 1959-  |e author. 
710 2 |a International Monetary Fund.  |b European Department,  |e issuing body. 
710 2 |a International Monetary Fund.  |b Fiscal Affairs Department,  |e issuing body. 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Berger, Helge.  |t Fiscal indulgence in Central Europe.  |d [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2004  |w (OCoLC)55881203 
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