Unionization and strategic trade policy /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Swagel, Phillip, author.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, European I Department and IMF Institute, 2000.
©2000
Description:1 online resource (17 pages).
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/00/53
IMF working paper ; WP/00/53.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12497655
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Tan, Ling Hui, author.
International Monetary Fund. European I Department, issuing body.
IMF Institute, issuing body.
ISBN:1451894287
9781451894288
1281600784
9781281600783
ISSN:2227-8885
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (page 17).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [S.l.] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
Summary:The literature on strategic trade policy has shown that in the presence of imperfect competition, activist use of trade and industrial policies can shift economic rents from foreign firms to domestic firms and thus increase home welfare. 2 Although this finding can be seen as providing justification for mercantilist policies such as import protection or export promotion, there is little empirical support for the existence of meaningful gains from strategic trade policy, and in any case practical application of such activist policies is beset with problems such as the difficulty of identifying the appropriate industry to target, judging the scope and magnitude of any policies, and the possibility of retaliation by trading partners that leaves all countries worse off. Moreover, extensions of the original and quite stylized theoretical framework underlying the strategic trade policy literature have shown that even the very possibility of welfare gains is sensitive to the specific assumptions made in the modeling framework.
Other form:Print version: Swagel, Phillip. Unionization and strategic trade policy. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, European I Dept. and IMF Institute., 2000
Standard no.:10.5089/9781451894288.001

MARC

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520 |a The literature on strategic trade policy has shown that in the presence of imperfect competition, activist use of trade and industrial policies can shift economic rents from foreign firms to domestic firms and thus increase home welfare. 2 Although this finding can be seen as providing justification for mercantilist policies such as import protection or export promotion, there is little empirical support for the existence of meaningful gains from strategic trade policy, and in any case practical application of such activist policies is beset with problems such as the difficulty of identifying the appropriate industry to target, judging the scope and magnitude of any policies, and the possibility of retaliation by trading partners that leaves all countries worse off. Moreover, extensions of the original and quite stylized theoretical framework underlying the strategic trade policy literature have shown that even the very possibility of welfare gains is sensitive to the specific assumptions made in the modeling framework. 
650 0 |a Labor unions  |x Economic aspects  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Commercial policy  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a International trade  |x Econometric models.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008104853 
650 0 |a Industrial policy  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Export subsidies  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Profit  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Competition, Imperfect  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Oligopolies  |x Econometric models. 
650 6 |a Syndicats  |x Aspect économique  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Politique commerciale  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Commerce international  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Politique industrielle  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Subventions à l'exportation  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Profit  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Concurrence imparfaite  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Oligopoles  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 7 |a Commercial policy  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00869570 
650 7 |a Competition, Imperfect  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00871505 
650 7 |a Export subsidies  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00918751 
650 7 |a Industrial policy  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00971441 
650 7 |a International trade  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00977133 
650 7 |a Oligopolies  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01045462 
650 7 |a Profit  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01078611 
655 4 |a Electronic books. 
700 1 |a Tan, Ling Hui,  |e author.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n92036629 
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