|
|
|
|
LEADER |
00000cam a2200000 a 4500 |
001 |
12497694 |
006 |
m o d |
007 |
cr bn||||||abp |
007 |
cr bn||||||ada |
008 |
100716s2007 dcua obs 000 0 eng d |
005 |
20240822221504.3 |
019 |
|
|
|a 805508061
|a 817800412
|a 889195253
|a 913466228
|a 945794637
|a 1044294423
|a 1056359668
|a 1073043245
|a 1103573001
|a 1107374514
|a 1144420262
|a 1202540566
|a 1276865140
|
020 |
|
|
|a 1283515008
|
020 |
|
|
|a 9781283515009
|
020 |
|
|
|a 1451910479
|
020 |
|
|
|a 9781451910476
|
020 |
|
|
|a 1462352812
|
020 |
|
|
|a 9781462352814
|
020 |
|
|
|a 1452716838
|
020 |
|
|
|a 9781452716831
|
020 |
|
|
|a 9786613827456
|
020 |
|
|
|a 6613827452
|
024 |
8 |
|
|a 10.5089/9781451910476.001
|
035 |
|
9 |
|a (OCLCCM-CC)648347933
|
035 |
|
|
|a (OCoLC)648347933
|z (OCoLC)805508061
|z (OCoLC)817800412
|z (OCoLC)889195253
|z (OCoLC)913466228
|z (OCoLC)945794637
|z (OCoLC)1044294423
|z (OCoLC)1056359668
|z (OCoLC)1073043245
|z (OCoLC)1103573001
|z (OCoLC)1107374514
|z (OCoLC)1144420262
|z (OCoLC)1202540566
|z (OCoLC)1276865140
|
037 |
|
|
|b 00013468
|
040 |
|
|
|a OCLCE
|b eng
|e pn
|c OCLCE
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCA
|d OCLCQ
|d IDEBK
|d EBLCP
|d OCLCF
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCO
|d VT2
|d YDXCP
|d OCLCQ
|d MERUC
|d CEF
|d CUS
|d AU@
|d OCLCQ
|d OCLCO
|d SFB
|d OCLCO
|
042 |
|
|
|a dlr
|
043 |
|
|
|a d------
|
049 |
|
|
|a MAIN
|
050 |
|
4 |
|a HG3881.5.I58
|b W67 NO.07/30
|
100 |
1 |
|
|a Berkmen, Pelin.
|
245 |
1 |
0 |
|a Precautionary monetary and fiscal policies /
|c prepared by Pelin Berkmen.
|
260 |
|
|
|a [Washington, D.C.] :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2007.
|
300 |
|
|
|a 1 online resource (27 pages) :
|b illustrations
|
336 |
|
|
|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
|
337 |
|
|
|a computer
|b c
|2 rdamedia
|
338 |
|
|
|a online resource
|b cr
|2 rdacarrier
|
504 |
|
|
|a Includes bibliographical references (pages 26-27).
|
520 |
|
|
|a This paper explains why the debt reduction motive for countries that are subject to borrowing constraints and a volatile environment is greater than for those with a more stable environment and relatively better access to the financial markets. In particular, it shows that the possibility of losing the ability to borrow in the future induces precautionary debt reduction. When a government loses its ability to borrow, shocks are more costly to the economy, since they cannot be spread over time. The precautionary motive arises from the need to make these adjustments less painful when the borrowing constraints bind. To avoid large losses in the constrained period, the government prefers to raise taxes and inflation in earlier periods more than would be implied otherwise, leaving less debt to the future periods, and thereby shifting some of the required adjustment to the earlier periods. In other words, the coexistence of large shocks and borrowing constraints forces the government to be more prudent in its management of debt.
|
506 |
|
|
|3 Use copy
|f Restrictions unspecified
|2 star
|5 MiAaHDL
|
533 |
|
|
|a Electronic reproduction.
|b [Place of publication not identified] :
|c HathiTrust Digital Library,
|d 2010.
|5 MiAaHDL
|
538 |
|
|
|a Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
|u http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
|5 MiAaHDL
|
583 |
1 |
|
|a digitized
|c 2010
|h HathiTrust Digital Library
|l committed to preserve
|2 pda
|5 MiAaHDL
|
588 |
0 |
|
|a Print version record.
|
505 |
0 |
|
|a I. Introduction; II. The Model; III. The Policy Problem; A. The Standard Case; The Last Period; The Second Period; The Third Period; B. Precautionary Motive; The Last Period; The Second Period; Figure; 1. Expected Marginal Loss for the Second Period; The Third Period; IV. Conclusions; Appendices; I. Derivation of Inflation for the Second Period in the Standard Case; II. The Coefficients of Inflation for the Second Period in the Standard Casae; III. Derivation of Inflation for the First Period in the Standard Case.
|
505 |
8 |
|
|a IV. The Coefficients of Expected Inflation for the Second Period in Section BV. Derivation of Inflation for the First Period in the Precautionary Case; References.
|
546 |
|
|
|a English.
|
650 |
|
0 |
|a Monetary policy
|z Developing countries
|x Econometric models.
|
650 |
|
0 |
|a Fiscal policy
|z Developing countries
|x Econometric models.
|
650 |
|
0 |
|a Debts, Public
|z Developing countries
|x Econometric models.
|
650 |
|
0 |
|a Monetary policy
|z Developing countries.
|
650 |
|
0 |
|a Fiscal policy
|z Developing countries.
|
650 |
|
0 |
|a Debts, Public
|z Developing countries.
|
650 |
|
6 |
|a Politique monétaire
|z Pays en voie de développement.
|
650 |
|
6 |
|a Politique fiscale
|z Pays en voie de développement.
|
650 |
|
6 |
|a Dettes publiques
|z Pays en voie de développement.
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Debts, Public
|x Econometric models.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst00888859
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Fiscal policy
|x Econometric models.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst00925810
|
650 |
|
7 |
|a Monetary policy
|x Econometric models.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst01025234
|
651 |
|
7 |
|a Developing countries.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst01242969
|
655 |
|
0 |
|a Electronic books.
|
655 |
|
4 |
|a Electronic books.
|
710 |
2 |
|
|a International Monetary Fund.
|b Research Department.
|0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n77001219
|
776 |
0 |
8 |
|i Print version:
|a Berkmen, Pelin.
|t Precautionary monetary and fiscal policies.
|d [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, 2007
|w (OCoLC)137754699
|
830 |
|
0 |
|a IMF working paper ;
|v WP/07/30.
|0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no89010263
|
856 |
4 |
0 |
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2007/030/001.2007.issue-030-en.xml
|y INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
|
929 |
|
|
|a oclccm
|
999 |
f |
f |
|i dbe4f175-0cef-5ece-a8cb-97412bd4b572
|s e6b9502e-1b60-5d9b-a723-2e9ec7b11e02
|
928 |
|
|
|t Library of Congress classification
|a HG3881.5.I58W67 NO.07/30
|l Online
|c UC-FullText
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2007/030/001.2007.issue-030-en.xml
|z INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
|g ebooks
|i 12141736
|