Optimal central bank conservatism and monopoly trade unions /

Optimal central bank conservatism and monopoly trade unions /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Berger, Helge.
Imprint:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2002.
Description:	1 online resource (29 pages)
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper ; WP/02/44 IMF working paper ; WP/02/44.
Subject:	Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models. Monetary policy -- Econometric models. Inflation (Finance) -- Econometric models. Labor unions -- Econometric models. Banks and banking, Central -- Econometric models. Inflation (Finance) -- Econometric models. Monetary policy -- Econometric models.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12497820

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	Hefeker, Carsten. Schöb, Ronnie. International Monetary Fund. European I Department.
ISBN:	1451893574 9781451893571 1281602523 9781281602527
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 28-29). Restrictions unspecified Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve Print version record.
Summary:	The "conservative central banker" has come under attack recently. On the basis of models in which there is explicit interaction between trade union behavior and monetary policy, it has been argued that if 'trade unions' are averse to inflation, welfare will be lower with a conservative than with a liberal central bank. We reframe this discussion in a standard trade union model. We show that the case against the conservative central banker rests exclusively on the assumption of a strictly nominal outside option (for instance, unemployment benefits) for the union. There is no welfare gain associated with making the central bank less conservative than society, however, if the outside option is in real terms. As the nominal components of the trade union's outside option are mainly public transfers, we also show that the conservative central banker is always optimal if the government can choose the level of nominal unemployment benefits as well as the degree of central bank conservatism.
Other form:	Print version: Berger, Helge. Optimal central bank conservatism and monopoly trade unions. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2002

Description
Summary:	The "conservative central banker" has come under attack recently. On the basis of models in which there is explicit interaction between trade union behavior and monetary policy, it has been argued that if 'trade unions' are averse to inflation, welfare will be lower with a conservative than with a liberal central bank. We reframe this discussion in a standard trade union model. We show that the case against the conservative central banker rests exclusively on the assumption of a strictly nominal outside option (for instance, unemployment benefits) for the union. There is no welfare gain associated with making the central bank less conservative than society, however, if the outside option is in real terms. As the nominal components of the trade union's outside option are mainly public transfers, we also show that the conservative central banker is always optimal if the government can choose the level of nominal unemployment benefits as well as the degree of central bank conservatism.
Physical Description:	1 online resource (29 pages)
Format:	Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Bibliography:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 28-29).
ISBN:	1451893574 9781451893571 1281602523 9781281602527