Optimal central bank conservatism and monopoly trade unions /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Berger, Helge.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2002.
Description:1 online resource (29 pages)
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/02/44
IMF working paper ; WP/02/44.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12497820
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Hefeker, Carsten.
Schöb, Ronnie.
International Monetary Fund. European I Department.
ISBN:1451893574
9781451893571
1281602523
9781281602527
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 28-29).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
Summary:The "conservative central banker" has come under attack recently. On the basis of models in which there is explicit interaction between trade union behavior and monetary policy, it has been argued that if 'trade unions' are averse to inflation, welfare will be lower with a conservative than with a liberal central bank. We reframe this discussion in a standard trade union model. We show that the case against the conservative central banker rests exclusively on the assumption of a strictly nominal outside option (for instance, unemployment benefits) for the union. There is no welfare gain associated with making the central bank less conservative than society, however, if the outside option is in real terms. As the nominal components of the trade union's outside option are mainly public transfers, we also show that the conservative central banker is always optimal if the government can choose the level of nominal unemployment benefits as well as the degree of central bank conservatism.
Other form:Print version: Berger, Helge. Optimal central bank conservatism and monopoly trade unions. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2002

MARC

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520 |a The "conservative central banker" has come under attack recently. On the basis of models in which there is explicit interaction between trade union behavior and monetary policy, it has been argued that if 'trade unions' are averse to inflation, welfare will be lower with a conservative than with a liberal central bank. We reframe this discussion in a standard trade union model. We show that the case against the conservative central banker rests exclusively on the assumption of a strictly nominal outside option (for instance, unemployment benefits) for the union. There is no welfare gain associated with making the central bank less conservative than society, however, if the outside option is in real terms. As the nominal components of the trade union's outside option are mainly public transfers, we also show that the conservative central banker is always optimal if the government can choose the level of nominal unemployment benefits as well as the degree of central bank conservatism. 
650 0 |a Banks and banking, Central  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Monetary policy  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Inflation (Finance)  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Labor unions  |x Econometric models. 
650 6 |a Banques centrales  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Politique monétaire  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Inflation  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Syndicats  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 7 |a Banks and banking, Central  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00827041 
650 7 |a Inflation (Finance)  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00972453 
650 7 |a Monetary policy  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01025234 
655 4 |a Electronic books. 
700 1 |a Hefeker, Carsten. 
700 1 |a Schöb, Ronnie. 
710 2 |a International Monetary Fund.  |b European I Department.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no92021092 
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