Accounting discretion of banks during a financial crisis /

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Huizinga, Harry, author.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2009.
Description:1 online resource (41 pages) : color illustrations
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/09/207
IMF working paper ; WP/09/207.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12497935
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Laeven, Luc, author.
International Monetary Fund. Research Department.
ISBN:1462332552
9781462332557
1451873549
9781451873542
128284413X
9781282844131
9786612844133
6612844132
1452734925
9781452734927
Digital file characteristics:data file
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 24-28).
English.
Print version record.
Summary:This paper shows that banks use accounting discretion to overstate the value of distressed assets. Banks' balance sheets overvalue real estate-related assets compared to the market value of these assets, especially during the U.S. mortgage crisis. Share prices of banks with large exposure to mortgage-backed securities also react favorably to recent changes in accounting rules that relax fair-value accounting, and these banks provision less for bad loans. Furthermore, distressed banks use discretion in the classification of mortgage-backed securities to inflate their books. Our results indicate that banks' balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks.
Other form:Print version: Huizinga, Harry. Accounting discretion of banks during a financial crisis. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2009