Optimal monetary policy with overlapping generations of policymakers /

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Shamloo, Maral, author.
Imprint:[Washington D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, 2010.
Description:1 online resource (35 pages) : color illustrations
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/10/32
IMF working paper ; WP/10/32.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12498375
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:International Monetary Fund, issuing body.
IMF Institute, issuing body.
ISBN:1451918798
9781451918793
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 33-35).
English.
Print version record.
Summary:In this paper I study the effect of imperfect central bank commitment on inflationary outcomes. I present a model in which the monetary authority is a committee that consists of members who serve overlapping, finite terms. Older and younger generations of Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) members decide on policy by engaging in a bargaining process. I show that this setup gives rise to a continuous measure of the degree of monetary authority's commitment. The model suggests that the lower the churning rate or the longer the tenure time, the closer social welfare will be to that under optimal commitment policy.
Other form:Print version: Shamloo, Maral. Optimal monetary policy with overlapping generations of policymakers. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2010

MARC

LEADER 00000cam a2200000Ia 4500
001 12498375
006 m o d
007 cr cn|||||||||
008 041202s2010 dcua ob i000 0 eng d
005 20240822221529.6
019 |a 1058566524 
020 |a 1451918798 
020 |a 9781451918793 
035 9 |a (OCLCCM-CC)680613568 
035 |a (OCoLC)680613568  |z (OCoLC)1058566524 
040 |a E7B  |b eng  |e pn  |c E7B  |d OCLCQ  |d CUS  |d OCLCQ  |d EBLCP  |d OCLCF  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCO  |d YDXCP  |d CUS  |d OCLCO  |d OCLCQ  |d MERUC  |d CEF  |d AU@  |d OCLCQ  |d OCLCO 
049 |a MAIN 
050 4 |a HG230.3  |b .S43 2010eb 
100 1 |a Shamloo, Maral,  |e author. 
245 1 0 |a Optimal monetary policy with overlapping generations of policymakers /  |c prepared by Maral Shamloo. 
260 |a [Washington D.C.] :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2010. 
300 |a 1 online resource (35 pages) :  |b color illustrations 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/10/32 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 33-35). 
520 3 |a In this paper I study the effect of imperfect central bank commitment on inflationary outcomes. I present a model in which the monetary authority is a committee that consists of members who serve overlapping, finite terms. Older and younger generations of Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) members decide on policy by engaging in a bargaining process. I show that this setup gives rise to a continuous measure of the degree of monetary authority's commitment. The model suggests that the lower the churning rate or the longer the tenure time, the closer social welfare will be to that under optimal commitment policy. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
505 0 |a Figures; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Related Literature; 2 Optimal Monetary Policy: The New Keynesian Framework; 2.1 Optimal Monetary Policy and Stabilization Bias; 2.2 Optimal Response under Discretion; 2.3 Optimal Response under Commitment; 3 Overlapping Generations of MPC Members; 3.1 A Two-Member MPC; 3.2 The Bargaining Process; 3.2.1 The Bargaining Problem; 3.2.2 The Utilitarian Solution and the Stationary Equilibrium; 3.3 n-Member Committee; 4 Utilitarian Bargaining vs. Voting; 5 Calibration and Simulation Results; 5.1 Impulse Responses to Independent Shocks. 
546 |a English. 
650 0 |a Monetary policy  |x Econometric models. 
650 0 |a Monetary policy  |x Mathematical models.  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2003010512 
650 0 |a Banks and banking, Central  |x Econometric models. 
650 6 |a Politique monétaire  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 6 |a Politique monétaire  |x Modèles mathématiques. 
650 6 |a Banques centrales  |x Modèles économétriques. 
650 7 |a Banks and banking, Central  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00827041 
650 7 |a Monetary policy  |x Econometric models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01025234 
650 7 |a Monetary policy  |x Mathematical models.  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst01025245 
655 4 |a Electronic books. 
710 2 |a International Monetary Fund,  |e issuing body. 
710 2 |a IMF Institute,  |e issuing body. 
776 0 8 |i Print version:  |a Shamloo, Maral.  |t Optimal monetary policy with overlapping generations of policymakers.  |d [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2010  |w (OCoLC)631278831 
830 0 |a IMF working paper ;  |v WP/10/32. 
856 4 0 |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2010/032/001.2010.issue-032-en.xml  |y INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 
929 |a oclccm 
999 f f |i ac0f5f86-f764-54cb-bccc-7ed1b269f2f2  |s 23e88a48-e310-5386-950a-f9ab0dc53e2e 
928 |t Library of Congress classification  |a HG230.3.S43 2010eb  |l Online  |c UC-FullText  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2010/032/001.2010.issue-032-en.xml  |z INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND  |g ebooks  |i 12142452